Who won the Battle of Jangjin Lake?

Roy E. Appleman, the author of US Army official history "South to Naktong, North to Yalu", writes that both sides could claim victory: the PVA 9th Army ultimately held the battlefield, while X Corps held off the Chinese 9th Army in a series of battles that enabled it to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit. Allan R. Millett qualifies a Chinese "geographic victory" that ejected X Corps from North Korea with the fact that the Chinese failed to achieve the objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division, adding that the campaign gave the UN confidence that it could withstand the superior numbers of the Chinese forces. The official Chinese history, published by PLA Academy of Military Science, states that despite the heavy casualties, the PVA 9th Army had earned its victory by successfully protecting the eastern flank of Chinese forces in Korea, while inflicting over 10,000 casualties to the UN forces.

Battle of Chosin Reservoir

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as the Chosin Reservoir Campaign or the Battle of Jangjin Lake () was a battle in the Korean War. The name "Chosin" is derived from the Japanese pronunciation ""Chōshin"", instead of the Korean pronunciation.

Official Chinese sources refer to this battle as the eastern part of the Second Phase Offensive (or Campaign) (第二次战役东线). The western half of the Second Phase Offensive resulted in a Chinese victory in the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River.

The battle took place about a month after the People's Republic of China entered the conflict and sent the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) 9th Army to infiltrate the northeastern part of North Korea. On 27 November 1950, the Chinese force surprised the US X Corps commanded by Major General Edward Almond at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal 17-day battle in freezing weather soon followed. Between 27 November and 13 December, 30,000 United Nations troops (later nicknamed "The Chosin Few") under the field command of Major General Oliver P. Smith were encircled and attacked by about 120,000 Chinese troops under the command of Song Shilun, who had been ordered by Mao Zedong to destroy the UN forces. The UN forces were nevertheless able to break out of the encirclement and to make a fighting withdrawal to the port of Hungnam, inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. US Marine units were supported in their withdrawal by the US Army's Task Force Faith to their east, which suffered heavy casualties and the full brunt of the Chinese offensive. The retreat of the US Eighth Army from northwest Korea in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River and the evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam in northeast Korea marked the complete withdrawal of UN troops from North Korea.

By mid-October 1950, after the successful landing at Inchon by the US X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army, the Korean War appeared to be all but over. United Nations (UN) forces advanced rapidly into North Korea with the intention of reuniting North and South Korea before the end of 1950. North Korea is divided through the center by the impassable Taebaek Mountains, which separated the UN forces into two groups. The US Eighth Army advanced north through the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps and the US X Corps advanced north on the eastern coast.

At the same time the People's Republic of China entered the conflict after issuing several warnings to the United Nations. On 19 October 1950, large formations of Chinese troops, dubbed the People's Volunteer Army (PVA), secretly crossed the border and into North Korea. One of the first Chinese units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN advances. On 25 October, the advancing ROK I Corps made contact with the Chinese and halted at Funchilin Pass (), south of the Chosin Reservoir. After the landing at Wonsan, the US 1st Marine Division of the X Corps engaged the defending PVA 124th Division on 2 November, and the ensuing battle caused heavy casualties among the Chinese. On 6 November, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a retreat to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces into the Chosin Reservoir. By 24 November, the 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni () on the eastern side of the reservoir, and Yudami-ni () on the west side of the reservoir.

Faced with the sudden attacks by Chinese forces in the Eighth Army sector, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army to launch the Home-by-Christmas Offensive. To support the offensive, MacArthur ordered the X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir and to cut the vital Manpojin—Kanggye—Huichon supply line. As a response, Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of the US X Corps, formulated a plan on 21 November. It called for the US 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the US 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni. The US 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing security in the rear area. By then the X Corps was stretched thin along a 400-mile front.

Surprised by the Marine landing at Wonsan, China's Chairman Mao Zedong called for the immediate destruction of the ROK Capital Division, ROK 3rd Infantry Division, US 1st Marine Division, and US 7th Infantry Division in a telegraph to Commander Song Shilun of the PVA 9th Army on 31 October. Under Mao's urgent orders, the 9th Army was rushed into North Korea on 10 November. Undetected by UN intelligence, the 9th Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on 17 November, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.

Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula. The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces. The battle's main focus was around the long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir, which served as the only retreat route for the UN forces. Through these roads, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri (now Changjin-ŭp) (). From there, the road passes through Koto-ri () and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam. The area around the Chosin Reservoir was sparsely populated.

The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War. The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass (), overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was poor, and in some places it was reduced to a one lane gravel trail. On 14 November 1950, a cold front from Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged, according to estimates, to as low as. The cold weather was accompanied by frozen ground, creating considerable danger of frostbite casualties, icy roads, and weapon malfunctions. Medical supplies froze; morphine syrettes had to be defrosted in a medic's mouth before they could be injected; frozen blood plasma was useless on the battlefield. Even cutting off clothing to deal with a wound risked gangrene and frostbite. Batteries used for the Jeeps and radios did not function properly in the temperature and quickly ran down. The lubrication in the guns gelled and rendered them useless in battle. Likewise, the springs on the firing pins would not strike hard enough to fire the round, or would jam.

Although the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan as part of Almond's US X Corps, Almond and Major General Oliver P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other that dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchon, when Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even though he had never been involved in one. Smith believed there were large numbers of Chinese forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher headquarters in Tokyo said otherwise, but Almond felt Smith was overly cautious. The mutual distrust between the commanders caused Smith to slow the 1st Marine Division's advance towards the Chosin Reservoir in violation of Almond's instructions. Smith established supply points and airfields along the way at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.

As the US X Corps was pushing towards the reservoir, the Chinese formulated their strategy, based on their experiences in the Chinese Civil War. Working from the assumption that only a light UN presence would be at the reservoir, the Chinese 9th Corps Army was first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri. Believing the bulk of the US X Corps would move to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Army would then block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam. The 9th Army initially committed eight divisions for the battle, with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.

The flaw in the Chinese plan was a lack of accurate intelligence about the UN forces. Even though the US X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the slow Marine advance allowed the bulk of the US 1st Marine Division, including the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines, to be concentrated at Yudami-ni. Furthermore, the strategically important Hagaru-ri, where a C-47-capable airfield was under construction and a supply dump, was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the 1st and 7th Marines. Only Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT-31), an understrength and hastily formed regimental combat team of the US 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank of the reservoir. Those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese assaults. As for the UN forces, the 1st Marine Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the battle, and it was further reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marine Commando and the equivalent of two regiments from the 3rd and 7th Army Infantry Divisions. The UN forces had a combined strength of about 30,000 men during the course of the battle. The UN forces at Chosin were also supported by one of the greatest concentrations of air power during the Korean War, since the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing stationed at Yonpo Airfield and five aircraft carriers from the US Navy's Task Force 77 were able to launch 230 sorties daily to provide close air support during the battle, while the US Air Force Far East Combat Cargo Command in Japan reached the capacity of airdropping 250 tons of supplies per day to resupply the trapped UN forces.

Although the 9th Corps Army was one of China's elite formations, composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign, several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle. Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November, but Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea before that could happen. As a result, the 9th Corps Army had almost no winter clothing for the harsh Korean winter. Similarly, poor logistics forced the 9th Corps Army to abandon heavy artillery, while working with little food and ammunition. The food shortage forced the 9th Corps Army to initially station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir in reserve, and starvation and exposure broke out among the Chinese units, since foraging was not an option in the sparsely populated area. By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops had died from the cold than from combat and air raids.

The Chinese strength is usually estimated at 120,000 troops for the battle, as the 9th Army was composed of 12 divisions with a strength of 10,000 men per division. Before arriving in Korea, the 9th Corps Army was also reinforced. Each of its three corps now had four divisions instead of the regular three. Infantry from two formerly "liberated" (surrendered) Nationalist divisions were absorbed to bring each infantry company up to strength. Some companies had approximately 150 men, but other companies were reinforced with more than 200 men. On average, each division of the 9th Army had more infantry troops than other Chinese divisions.

Eventually, all 12 Chinese divisions of the 9th Corps Army were deployed. Eight divisions of the PVA 20th and 27th Corps served as the main attacking force. Four divisions of the PVA 26th Corps initially were held back in reserve, and deployed after 20th and 27th Corps exhausted all their available strength.

On the night of 27 November, the PVA 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Corps Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Kot'o-ri. At Yudam-ni, the 5th, 7th and 11th Marines were surrounded and attacked by the PVA 79th and 89th Divisions, with the 59th Division attacking the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri to cut off communication. Similarly, RCT-31 was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th, 81st and 94th Divisions. At Hagaru-ri, the 1st Marine Division command headquarters was attacked by the PVA 58th Division. Finally, the PVA 60th Division surrounded elements of the 1st Marines at Kot'o-ri from the north. Caught by complete surprise, the UN forces were cut off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri and Kot'o-ri by 28 November.

Acting on Almond's instruction, Smith ordered the 5th Marines to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on 27 November. The attack was soon stalled by the PVA 89th Division and forced the Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni. As night came, three Chinese regiments of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke. Close range fighting soon developed as the attackers infiltrated Marine positions, but the 5th and 7th Marines held the line while inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. As day broke on 28 November, the Chinese and Americans were locked in a stalemate around the Yudam-ni perimeter.

While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending Charlie and Fox Companies of the 7th Marines. The successful assault forced Charlie Company to retreat into Yudam-ni, which left Fox Company commanded by Captain William E. Barber isolated on a hill overlooking the Toktong Pass, a vital pass that controlled the road. On 29 November, several efforts by the 7th Marines failed to rescue Fox Company, despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and Marine Corsair fighters, Fox Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.

After the heavy losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, 9th Corps Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the 1st Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that was double the initial estimate. Believing that any further assaults would be futile, Song Shilun ordered the 9th Army to switch their main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri, leaving Yudam-ni alone from 28 to 30 November. At the same time, the US Eighth Army on the Korean western front was forced into full retreat at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, and MacArthur ordered Almond to withdraw the US X Corps to the port of Hungnam. Acting on the instruction of Almond and Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanders of the 5th and 7th Marines, respectively, issued a joint order to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on 30 November. Faced with tough fighting between the blocking Chinese divisions and the withdrawing Marines, Smith remarked: "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction."

For the breakout, the Marines formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) would attack towards Fox Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass. To start the breakout, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) had to first attack south and capture Hills 1542 and 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks. The breakout was carried out under the air cover of the 1st Marine Air Wing.
On the morning of 1 December, 3/7 Marines engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hills 1542 () and 1419 (). The Chinese defenders soon forced the Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks when the convoy passed 3/7's position by the afternoon. With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni, while the 89th Division rushed south towards Kot'o-ri. The Chinese struck at night, and the ferocity of the fighting forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks. The fighting lasted well into the morning of 2 December until all the Marines had managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.

At the same time, 1/7 Marines also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on 1 December. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield. As night approached, 1/7 finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road. Relying on the element of surprise, they managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road. On the morning of 2 December, a joint attack by Fox Company and 1/7 secured the Toktong Pass, thus opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.

Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still had to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties on 3/5 Marines. Although strong air cover suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and roadblocks slowed the retreat to a crawl, while inflicting numerous casualties. Despite those difficulties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of 3 December, with the withdrawal completed on 4 December.

RCT-31, later known as "Task Force Faith," was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin, with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the Pyungnyuri Inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni () south of Sinhung-ni. Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the task force was actually understrength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.

On the night of 27 November, three regiments from the 80th Division attacked the northern hills () and the inlet, completely surprising the defenders. The ensuing battle inflicted heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, to the north of Sinhung-ni, while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, were almost overrun at the Pyungnyuri Inlet. The Chinese also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221 (), an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni. As the night's fighting ended, RCT-31 was separated into three elements.

Believing that the defenders had been completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceeded to loot the US positions for food and clothing. As morning came on 28 November, the 3/31st Infantry counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the surprised Chinese back in a complete rout. In the afternoon, Almond flew into the Sinhung-ni perimeter of RCT-31, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack north and deal with whatever "remnants" of Chinese forces that were in their way. Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Stars to three of Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., the commander of the 1/32nd Infantry, threw his medal into the snow.
On the night of 28 November, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with four regiments. At the inlet, the Chinese assault became a disaster as communications broke down, while devastating fire from the M16 and M19 anti-aircraft (AA) guns attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion swept the Chinese ranks. In the aftermath of the fighting, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had fewer than 600 soldiers. The attacks by PVA 240th Regiment, on the other hand, forced Maclean to order a retreat from the northern hills towards Sinhung-ni. On 29 November, the 1st Battalion managed to break through the Chinese blockade and reached the Sinhung-ni perimeter, but Maclean was lost when he mistook some Chinese soldiers for American. The Chinese finally stopped their attacks on the night of 29 November, while waiting for fresh reinforcements.

While RCT-31 was under siege, Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni, an impossible order for Smith to implement. Only the 31st Tank Company tried to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221 from Hudong-ni, but without infantry support, the two armored attacks on 28 and 29 November were stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults. By 30 November, the US forces evacuated Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.

On 30 November, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into Sinhung-ni and met with Faith, who by now had assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to bring along. On the same day, parts of the PVA 94th Division and the rest of the 81st Divisionarrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division. By midnight, six Chinese regiments renewed their attacks, and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn. Again, the 57th Battalion's AA guns held the Chinese at bay, but the shell supplies were running desperately low. On the day of 1 December, Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.
The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide air cover on 1 December. As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the Sudong-ni perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces, with three other regiments closing in. Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and US troops. The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company, allowing the convoy to advance. As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks. Chinese fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide. Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon. Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column. As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by a Chinese grenade and subsequently died of his wounds. The convoy managed to fight past the first roadblock, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks. Out of the original 2,500 soldiers, about 1,050 managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and only 385 survivors were deemed able-bodied. The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.

To support the Marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. Smith and 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri. With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marines, the rest of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from both the Army and the Marine Corps.

The original Chinese plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of 27 November, but the division became lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps it used. It was not until the dawn of 28 November that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri. Meanwhile, from the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri noticed the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1), predicted the Chinese attack would come on the night of 28 November. Almost everyone, including rear support units with little combat training, was pressed into service on the front line due to the manpower shortage, and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.

It was not long before the PVA 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter, while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on the northern perimeter. Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was overwhelmed, with the Chinese opening several gaps in the defenses and reaching the rear areas. The resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the Chinese soldiers, who began looting food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation. The defending Americans managed to destroy the Chinese forces in counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close. When the fighting stopped, the Chinese had only gained the East Hill () on the northern perimeter. Another attack was planned for the night of 29 November, but air raids by VMF-542 broke up the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.
Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, on November 29, Smith ordered Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller of the First Marine Regiment to assemble a task force to be sent north from Kot'o-ri to open the road south of Hagaru-ri. A task force was formed with 921 troops from the 41 Royal Marine Commando, G Company of the 1st Marines and B Company of the 31st Infantry. It was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Commando. On the afternoon of 29 November, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri, while under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division. The task force's harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley". As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized, and a destroyed truck in the convoy later split the task force into two segments. Although the lead segment fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of 29 November, the rear segment was destroyed. Despite suffering 162 dead and missing and 159 wounded, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defense at Hagaru-ri.

As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni on 30 November, the garrisons attempted to recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed, despite the destruction of a Chinese company. When darkness settled, the PVA 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last-ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri. The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill giving way. As the Chinese tried to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.

By 1 December, the PVA 58th Division was virtually destroyed, with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army. Much to the frustration of Song Shilun, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the Marines broke out of Yudam-ni. The airfield was opened to traffic on 1 December, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and wounded. With the Marines at Yudam-ni completing their withdrawal on 4 December, the trapped UN forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.

After a short rest, the breakout began on 6 December, with the 7th Marines as the vanguard of the retreating column, while the 5th Marines covered the rear. At the same time, the much-delayed PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Divisions to relieve the 58th and 60th Divisions. As the 7th Marines pushed aside the PVA 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marines took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th Division. In a last effort to stop the breakout, the customary Chinese night attack was launched, with the 76th and 77th Division striking the Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions. The Marines repulsed the attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.

Meanwhile, the 7th Marines opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high ground surrounding the road. But as soon as the Marines pulled out, the 77th Division returned to the peaks and attacked the column. Chaotic fighting broke out and the retreat was slowed to a crawl. The Marine night fighters, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces, and most of the blocking troops were eliminated. On 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with little difficulty, with the last elements reaching Kot'o-ri that night.

After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and 27th Corps to chase the escaping UN force, with the 20th Corps assigned to block the escape route. But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions. In desperation, Song Shilun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass, while blowing up the vital treadway bridge, hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces. The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 () blew up the original concrete bridge and two improvised replacements in succession, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable. In response, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on 9 December, though the defenders fought to the last man. At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the treadway bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders who were already frozen in their foxholes.
With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass, eight C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by the US 314th Troop Carrier Wing were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute. The bridge, consisting of eight separate long, sections, was dropped one section at a time, using a parachute on each section. Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the US Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on 9 December, enabling UN forces to proceed. Outmaneuvered, the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions combined had only 200 soldiers left. The last UN forces left Funchilin Pass by 11 December.

One of the last engagements during the withdrawal was an ambush at Sudong () by the pursuing PVA 89th Division, which Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty. The trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on 11 December.

By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, MacArthur had already ordered the evacuation of the US X Corps on 8 December in order to reinforce the US Eighth Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel. Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and the US 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions had also set up defensive positions around the port. Some skirmishes broke out between the defending US 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry and the pursuing PVA 27th Corps, but against the strong naval gun fire support provided by US Navy Task Force 90, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.

In what US historians called the "greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history", a 193-ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean refugees. One Victory ship, the, evacuated 14,000 refugees by herself, despite being designed to carry only 12 passengers. The last UN unit left at 14:36 on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the enemy. The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.

The US X Corps and the ROK I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties: 4,385 US Marines, 3,163 US Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 British Royal Marines. The 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather. Despite the losses, the US X Corps preserved much of its strength. About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan, and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. Commanding General Smith was credited for saving the US X Corps from destruction, while the 1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal Marines Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their tenacity during the battle. Fourteen Marines, two other soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname "The Chosin Few". On 15 September 2010, the Veterans of the Korean War Chosin Reservoir Battle memorial was unveiled by the United States Marine Corps Commandant General James T. Conway at Camp Pendleton.

The PVA 9th Army, on the other hand, officially reported 48,156 casualties during the course of the battle - about one third of its total strength. Of those casualties, 19,202 were attributed to combat, while 28,954 were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and lack of food. Outside of official channels, the estimation of Chinese casualties has been described as high as 60,000 by Patrick C. Roe, the chairman of Chosin Few Historical Committee, citing the number of replacements requested by 9th Army in the aftermath of the battle. Regardless of the varying estimates, historian Yan Xue of PLA National Defence University noted that the 9th Army was put out of action for three months. With the absence of 9th Army the Chinese order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions by December 31, 1950, as opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on November 16, 1950.

During the battle, UN dead were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. Operation Glory took place from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war camps were turned over to the South Korean government. After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in Honolulu, Hawaii). According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted from the Chinese and North Koreans during the operation, of which 858 proved to be correct. The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns. From 1990 to 1994, North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to 400 US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains. From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the Chinese border between 1996 and 2006.

Eliot A. Cohen writes that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory which inflicted such heavy losses on the Chinese Ninth Army Group that it was put out of action until March 1951. Paul M. Edwards, founder of the Center for the Study of the Korean War, draws parallels between the battle at Chosin and the Dunkirk evacuation. He writes that the retreat from Chosin following a "massive strategic victory" by the Chinese has been represented as "a moment of heroic history" for the UN forces. Appleman, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of a sea-borne evacuation to preserve the UN forces, believing that had the UN forces possessed determined leadership and good soldier morale, the X Corps could also fight its way to Wonson due to the weakened state of Sino-Korean forces. Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledges X Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, and writes that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory." Bruce Cumings simply refers to the battle as a "terrible defeat" for the Americans.

Patrick C. Roe, who served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Marine Regiment at Chosin, asserts that X Corps directly allowed the Eighth Army to hold the south and quoted MacArthur in corroborating his view. Yu Bin, a historian and a former member of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, states that while the destruction of Task Force Faith was the single greatest Chinese victory of the war, ultimately the PVA 9th Army Group had become "a giant hospital" while failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin as planned. Zhang Renchu, whose 26th Corps was blamed for allowing the X Corps to escape, had threatened suicide over the outcome, while Song Shilun offered to resign his post.

The battle exacerbated inter-service hostility, the Marines blaming the US Army and its leadership for the failure. The collapse of the army units fighting on the east of the reservoir was regarded as shameful, and for many years afterwards their role in the battle was largely ignored. Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought, and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952.

The Marines evacuated from North Korea spent January and most of February 1951 rebuilding in the relatively secure south of South Korea and "chasing guerrillas" in Pohang. They returned to regular and heavy action on February 21 in Operation Killer.

The battle was part of the PRC's intervention in the Korean War ended the UN force's expectation of total victory, including the liberation of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula. By the end of 1950, communist forces had recaptured North Korea and pushed UN forces back south of the 38th parallel. Serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all US forces from the Korean peninsula, and US military leaders made secret contingency plans to do so. The disregard by Far Eastern Command under MacArthur of the initial warnings and diplomatic hints by the PVA almost led the entire United Nations army to disaster at Ch'ongch'on River and Chosin Reservoir, and only after the formation and stabilization of a coherent UN defensive line under Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway did the "period of headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe" cease.

On the other hand, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the United Nations Command to secure its position in South Korea, while losing North Korea. First, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, PVA commanders were persuaded by their victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on that they could "defeat American armed forces", and this led to "unrealistic expectations that the CPV [PVA] would work miracles." Second, the heavy casualties caused by sub-zero temperatures and combat, plus poor logistical support weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two were forced to disband, With the absence of 12 out of 30 of Chinese divisions in Korea in early 1951, Roe says that the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.
Footnotes

Citations


What's the speed limit on the autobahn?

In 1973, in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, a federal speed limit of 100 km/h (62 mph) on Autobahns was imposed to help conserve fuel for fear of impending future shortages (not for environmental or safety reasons). The measure only lasted from December 1973 to March 1974; while the administration and the Bundestag were in favor of keeping the speed limit, the Bundesrat pushed to repeal the law. As a compromise, a "recommended speed" was introduced on Autobahns and "highways outside of built-up areas with a center divide or without a center divide and a continuous lane for overtaking in both directions". This law is basically still in effect today. Unrestricted non-Autobahn highways, however, have since become virtually non-existent or replaced by "Schnellstraßen", Autobahn-like expressways typically limited to 120 or 130 km/h and normally only covering a few kilometers.

Speed limits in Germany

General speed limits in Germany are set by the federal government. All limits are multiples of 5 km/h. There are two default speed limits: 50 km/h (31 mph) inside built-up areas and 100 km/h (62 mph) outside built-up areas. While parts of the autobahns and many other freeway-style highways have posted limits up to 130 km/h (81 mph) based on accident experience, congestion and other factors, many rural sections have no general speed limit. The German Highway Code ("Straßenverkehrsordnung") section on speed begins with the requirement which may be rendered in English:
Any person driving a vehicle may only drive so fast that the car is under control. Speeds must be adapted to the road, traffic, visibility and weather conditions as well as the personal skills and characteristics of the vehicle and load.
This requirement applies to all roads, and is similar to the "reasonable speed" legal obligation levied in other nations.

Speed limits are enforced with a small tolerance. Driving merely 3 km/h (2 mph) or faster above the posted or implied speed limit is considered a punishable infraction in Germany. The speeding fines are set by federal law ("Bußgeldkatalog", schedule of fines).

The Nazi-era Road Traffic Act of 28 May 1934 imposed the first nationwide speed limit: maximum in urban areas, but no limit on rural highways or autobahns. In October 1939, the Nazis further throttled speeds in order to conserve fuel: in urban areas, elsewhere. After the war, the four Allied occupation zones established their own speed limits until the divided East German and West German republics were constituted in 1949; initially, the Nazi speed limits were restored in both East and West Germany.

In December 1952 the West German legislature voted to abolish "all" speed limits, reverting to State-level decisions. However, rising traffic fatalities led to a partial reversal: an urban speed limit of became effective 1 September 1957, despite resistance by the German Auto Club. By 1970, fatalities had climbed to over 19,000; in 1972 a general rural speed limit of went into effect—except on motorways. At 14 November 1983 the Hamburg suburb of Buxtehude had the first implementation of limits in residential areas, a concept that became popular.

East Germany's safety efforts primarily focused on restrictive traffic regulation; for examples, zero alcohol tolerance, on autobahns and outside cities. Within two years after German reunification in 1990, the availability of high-powered vehicles and a 54% increase in motorized traffic led to a doubling of annual traffic deaths, "despite" interim continuation of prior speed restrictions. An extensive program of the four Es (enforcement, education, engineering, and emergency response) brought the number of traffic deaths back to pre-unification levels after ten years while traffic regulations were conformed to western standards (e.g., 130 km/h (81 mph) Autobahn advisory limit, 100 km/h (62 mph) on other rural roads, and 0.5 milligrams BAC.

German autobahns are famous for having no universal motorway speed limit, although slightly more than 50% of them have posted speed limits and about 10% are equipped with motorway control systems that can show variable speed limits. There is no national speed limit, either, for cars and motorcycles on any highway outside of towns if it has a central reservation or a minimum of two marked lanes per direction. Due to this it is common to be overtaken by cars or motorcycles travelling over 200 km/h (125 mph). On such roads, as well as motorways, a recommended speed limit ("Richtgeschwindigkeit") of 130 km/h (81 mph) applies. While driving at higher speeds is not punishable, the increased risk induced by higher speeds ("erhöhte Betriebsgefahr") may result in partial liability for damages. Moreover, the law forbids travel at speeds that would extend the vehicle's minimum halting distance beyond the driver's line of sight. On all German roads, there are speed limits for trucks, buses, cars towing trailers, and small motorised vehicles (Mopeds, etc.).

The introduction of a national speed limit for motorways and similar roads has been on the agenda of various political and environmentalist groups for decades, but at present, there are still no definite plans on behalf of the federal government regarding the matter.

The "Umweltbundesamt (Federal Environmental Agency)" repeated its recommendation of such regulation in early 2007, but the Merkel administration saw no need for it. Even after a 2007 party congress held by the SPD, then one of Germany's governing parties, where a proposal to impose a blanket speed limit was approved, there was outspoken opposition within the administration. At present, it is generally thought that a blanket speed limit would not be significantly beneficial, regarding both environmental and climate concerns and road safety. Current estimates conclude that a speed limit would reduce Germany's overall CO2 emission by a mere fraction of a percent, and in terms of highway safety, German Autobahns are among the world's safest.

Legally, however, state and even local authorities have the power to enact speed limits. The district of Köln / (Cologne) has posted a speed limit on the heavily frequented Kölner Autobahnring / (Cologne Beltway). Effective 9 April 2008, the City-State of Bremen began enforcing a general 120 km/h (75 mph) speed limit, citing environmental concerns. However, Bremen's new limit only impacted an additional 11 kilometers of Bremen's 60 kilometers of Autobahn; most Bremen motorways already had some speed restriction due to congestion and noise.

In 2006, half of German motorways had no maximum speed limit at any time of day or under any traffic conditions. Roughly one third of regulated roads have computer-controlled traffic guiding systems with variable electronic signs along carriageways showing the set speed limit, or, current road conditions and traffic density allowing, indicating that no speed limit is set at the moment.

Posted minimum speeds usually only apply to specific lanes like the common configuration on 6-lane roads with a minimum speed of 110 km/h (68 mph) on the left and 90 km/h (56 mph) on the center lane. Vehicles which cannot sustain speeds of 60 km/h (37 mph) on the flat are not allowed on the Autobahn, however. Because of this, many European self-propelled cranes and other extra-heavy trucks which would be unsafe at much higher speeds, but similarly unsafe or impractical (and certainly obstructive) to drive for long distances on surface streets between job sites and depots, are engineered with maximum design speeds a little over 60 km/h - typically 62 km/h (39 mph) at governed engine speed in top gear.

In 2013, autobahns carried 31% of motorized road traffic while accounting for 13% of Germany's traffic deaths. The autobahn fatality rate of 1.9 deaths per billion-travel-kilometers compared favorably with the 4.7 rate on urban streets and 6.6 rate on rural roads.

Between 1970 and 2010, overall German road fatalities decreased by almost 80% from 19,193 to 3,648; over the same time period, autobahn deaths halved from 945 to 430 deaths. Statistics for 2013 show total German traffic deaths declined to the lowest count ever recorded: 3340; a representative of the Federal Statistical Office attributed the general decline to harsh winter weather that delayed the start of the motorcycle-riding season. However, autobahn deaths increased over 2012 counts (from 387 to 428). Nevertheless autobahn deaths with involved trucks are increased. The reason is more truck traffic and traffic jams caused of roadworks. Whereas accidents without involved trucks are decrasing again.

Rural roads, except for motorways or other designated fast roads, have a speed limit of 100 km/h (62 mph), which is routinely reduced to 70 km/h (43 mph) or 80 km/h (50 mph) where the road approaches a junction with a significant side-road. Tree-lined scenic routes, such as the German Avenue Road, often have 70 km/h (43 mph) limits. Lorries, some buses, and cars towing trailers have lower speed limits as well.

In 2015, the German Safety Council recommended that the general limit be set at 80 km/h (50 mph) for rural roads less than six meters wide. The proposed speed would reduce the differential with trucks 3.5 metric tonne trucks, which generally travel at 60 km/h (37 mph). In 2013, rural roads spanned approximately 200,000 kilometers in length, and killed at least 1,934 people.

There is a general speed limit within built up areas, which are marked by distinctive rectangular yellow signs showing the name of the village, town or city, of 50 km/h (31 mph) but residential areas usually have a lower posted speed limit of 30 km/h (18 mph). On arterial roads, the speed limit may be raised to 60 or 70 km/h (37 to 43 mph); this higher speed limit will be posted in the usual way. Motorways crossing cities count as normal Autobahns and can be used for travel within larger cities in many cases.

Minimum speeds are very rarely marked in Germany.

There is a general speed limit of 80 km/h (50 mph) for trucks with a GVWR over 3,500 kg (7,716 lbs) and for vehicles with trailers. For vehicles with a GVWR of over 7,500 kg (16,534 lbs) the limit is set to 60 km/h (37 mph) except on autobahns (also 80 km/h). For coaches and cars with trailers the limit is increased to 100 km/h on autobahns (under certain requirements). Posted speed signs for trucks are not common, they can be seen on some dangerous curves or descents.

Trucks over 3,500 kg are required to have a built-in speed limiter for a maximum speed of 90 km/h (56 mph), and buses for a maximum speed of 100 km/h (62 mph). There are a few exceptions for army, police, fire brigade or scientific purposes.

One distinguishing characteristic between German "Bundesstraßen" and "Autobahnen" is that there usually is a general 100 km/h (62 mph) speed limit on federal highways out of built-up areas, as opposed to the merely advisory speed limit ("Richtgeschwindigkeit") of 130 km/h (83 mph) in unmarked sections of the autobahns. However, a number of "Bundesstraßen" have been extended as expressways (dual carriageways) (colloquially called "Yellow Autobahns"). Many of these have speed limits of usually 100–120 km/h, others have only an advisory speed limit like autobahns. Most sections of the federal highways are only single carriageway with one lane for each direction and no hard shoulder pull-out area.

Bundesstraße

Bundesstraße (German for "federal highway"), abbreviated B, is the denotation for German and Austrian national highways.

Germany's "Bundesstraßen" network has a total length of about 40,000 km.
German "Bundesstraßen" are labelled with rectangular yellow signs with black numerals, as opposed to the white-on-blue markers of the "Autobahn" controlled-access highways. "Bundesstraßen", like autobahns, are maintained by the federal agency of the Transport Ministry. In the German highway system they rank below autobahns, but above the "Landesstraßen" and "Kreisstraßen" maintained by the federal states and the districts respectively. The numbering was implemented by law in 1932 and has overall been retained up to today, except for those roads located in the former eastern territories of Germany.

The closest equivalent in the United States would be the U.S. highway system.

In contrast to Germany, according to a 2002 amendment of the Austrian federal road act, "Bundesstraßen" is the official term referring only to autobahns ("Bundesstraßen A") and limited-access roads ("Schnellstraßen, Bundesstraßen S"). The administration of all other former federal highways ("Bundesstraßen B") has passed to the federal states ("Bundesländer").

Therefore, officially classified as "Landesstraßen", they are still colloquially called "Bundesstraßen" and have retained their "B" designation (except for Vorarlberg), followed by the number and a name. They are marked by a blue square sign with white number and are per se priority roads.

Before 2002 there has been a further category of "Bundesstraßen" with circular yellow sign and black number that shows that this road has no fixed priority (right of way for users). A few yellow signs lived longer than 2002.

Unlike German autobahns, on Austrian autobahns a general speed limit of 130 km/h (81 mph) is set, although as of August 25, 2018, the FPÖ government has been going on a trial for a possible speed limit increase to 140 km/h (87 mph) on the Autobahn 1 freeway. They may only be used by powered vehicles that are designed to achieve at least. While on the motorway voluntary stops, U-turns and backward driving are prohibited.

Autobahns of Austria

The Austrian autobahns are controlled-access highways in Austria. They are officially called "Bundesstraßen A (Bundesautobahnen)" under the authority of the Federal Government according to the Austrian Federal Road Act ("Bundesstraßengesetz"), not to be confused with the former "Bundesstraßen" highways maintained by the Austrian states since 2002.

Ideas to build up a limited-access road network with grade separated interchanges had been developed already in the 1920s, including a "Nibelungen" highway along the Donau (Danube) river from Passau to Wien (Vienna) and further on towards Budapest. Those plans however had never been carried out due to the lasting economic crisis that hit the country after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1918, exacerbated by the Great Depression.

The first autobahn on Austrian territory was the West Autobahn from Salzburg to Wien. Building started immediately after the Austrian Anschluss in 1938 [the annexation of Austria] on order of Adolf Hitler as extension of the German "Reichsautobahn-Strecke 26" from München (Munich) (the present-day Bundesautobahn 8). However, only including the branch-off of the planned Tauern Autobahn had been finished on 13 September 1941. Construction works discontinued the next year due to World War II. After the war delaying resistance by the Soviet occupation forces as well as claims raised by West Germany to the former "Reichsautobahn" assets obstructed the resumption until 1954.

Construction started in the US-occupied zone of Salzburg and Upper Austria, partly relying on the pre-war planning, and were extended after the country gained full sovereignty by the 1955 Austrian State Treaty. The first section of the West Autobahn up to Mondsee was opened in 1958, by 1967 the route between Salzburg and Wien / Vienna was completed. From 1959 onwards the Süd Autobahn was built to reach the southern state capitals of Graz and Klagenfurt from Wien / Vienna. The construction of the Tauern Autobahn was not resumed until 1969. The Inn Valley Autobahn in the western state of Tyrol was built from 1968 onwards, up to today it is not directly connected to the main Austrian autobahn network, as via motorway drivers have to use the German autobahns BAB 8 and 93 along the "Deutsches Eck" link.

Austria currently has 18 autobahns, since 1982 built and maintained by the self-financed ASFiNAG stock company in Vienna, which is wholly owned by the Austrian republic and earns revenue from road-user charges and tolls. Each route bears a number as well as an official name with local reference, which however is not displayed on road signs. Unusually for European countries, interchanges (between motorways called "Knoten", "knots") are numbered by distance in kilometres starting from where the route begins; this arrangement is also used in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Spain, and most provinces of Canada (and in most American states, albeit in miles). The current Austrian Autobahn network has a total length of.

The system is going to be expanded; one Autobahn is currently under construction, and one more is planned. The transit traffic across the main chain of the Alps especially by trucks had led to a considerable environmental load to the fragile Alpine ecosystem. Several action groups urge the transfer of freight transport from road to rail. In 1991 Austria signed the Alpine Convention on the protection of the natural environment.

"Schnellstraßen" (officially "Bundesstraßen S") are federal limited-access roads very similar to "Autobahnen"; the chief difference is that they are more cheaply built with fewer tunnels, mostly just following the given topography. Depending on the road extension, they are either signposted as "Autobahn" or "Autostraße" according to Austrian traffic regulations. The speed limit on "Schnellstraßen" is 130 km/h, however on some it is 100 km/h indicated by a sign. The current "Schnellstraßen" system has a total length of.

As they fit better with the mountainous topography of Austria, "Schnellstraßen" often serve as an autobahn substitute. For example, the main link between the Austria's westernmost state of Vorarlberg and adjacent Tyrol is entirely provided by the "S16 Arlberg Schnellstraße", including the Arlberg Road Tunnel completed in 1979.

Since 1997, the use of all "Autobahnen" and "Schnellstraßen" requires the purchase of a vignette (toll sticker) for passenger cars up to 3.5 tonnes or a "GO-Box" (electronic toll system) for trucks and buses. The toll fee ("Maut") has to be paid to legally access the Austrian Autobahns at any time except the Autobahns listed below. On routes which are more costly to maintain, mostly Alpine routes with tunnels—sections of the Pyhrn Autobahn, the Tauern Autobahn (Tauern Tunnel) and the Karawanken Autobahn (Karawanken Tunnel), as well as the Brenner Autobahn—a toll should be paid which is collected at time of use via toll plazas and therefore drivers do not need to have a vignette to use these Autobahns.

Vignettes (coll. "Pickerl") are available in varying lengths of validity (10 days, two months, or a year)., a vignette valid for a year costs €85.70 for cars and €34.10 for motorcycles. To prove to have paid this fee, the toll stickers have to be put onto the inside of the front windscreen. Once removed, they no longer are valid, so each car on Austrian Autobahns needs its own toll sticker.

Since 2004 trucks must carry the "GO-Box", a little white box which counts the length of the Autobahn used by way of electrical control points, queried by overhead DSRC microwave radio transceivers at different locations. Overhead 3-D infrared laser scanners are used to detect and photograph trucks travelling without it.

A fine of €110 must be paid if a vehicle is on the motorway without a GO-Box or a vignette, or a fine of €240 if a vignette is not affixed onto the windscreen or in one of the approved places or the vehicle is on the motorway with a vignette that has expired or been tampered with. If the driver refuses to pay the fine, then the fine will increase to between €300 and €3,000.


Where was Stuart Syvret born?

Stuart Syvret was born in Jersey and educated at Halkett Place School, St Helier Boys School and Highlands College. He obtained City and Guilds Craft and Advanced Craft in carpentry and joinery and went on to become a Member of the Institute of Carpenters. He was a Cabinet maker before entering politics.

Stuart Syvret

Stuart Syvret is a political activist in Jersey. He held elected office as a member of the States of Jersey assembly from 1990 to 2010. From 1999 to 2007, Svyret had executive responsibilities first as President of the Health and Social Services Committee and, after the 2005 constitutional reforms, as Minister for Health and Social Services in the Council of Ministers. He was dismissed from ministerial office in September 2007 and returned to the backbenches until he was disqualified from membership of the States in April 2010 due to his absence from the island. He has been involved in a series of legal proceedings, as a defendant in a criminal prosecution in Jersey and as a claimant in judicial review and civil claims in Jersey and London.

He has been described by journalists as "the 'bete noire' of Jersey politics", a "self-taught intellectual", an "agitator", "critical of the finance industry", "one of the island's most outspoken senators" "a rarity, an anti-establishment Jersey politician", "a maverick politician" and having a "ludicrous vision of a corrupt state bent on limitless cover-ups, victimisation and systematic injustice".

Syvret was elected, at his third attempt, to the States of Jersey in 1990 for a three-year term as Deputy of Saint Helier District 3&4 as a member of the Jersey Green Party.

Standing as an independent, Syvret was elected for a six-year term as Senator in 1993, coming second in the poll for six vacant seats with 14,388 votes. He was re-elected in 1999, coming top of poll with 15,212 votes, and in 2005 (again top of poll for six vacant seats with 15,131 votes).

In accordance with the States of Jersey Law 2005, Syvret was disqualified from his senatorial seat in April 2010 due to 6 months' absence from the island. He had gone to live in London during his trial in Jersey for data protection and motoring offences.

On his return from London in 2010, Syvret unsuccessfully fought a by-election in June 2010. He came second out of a field of nine candidates, polling 3,437 votes.

He was a candidate for senator in the October 2011 elections. He failed to be elected, finishing seventh out of 13 candidates for four vacant seats with 6,402 votes.

During his first nine years as a States member, Syvret held various positions including chairing a committee on Freedom of Information and membership of the House Committee, Establishment Committee, Public Services, Legislation Committee, and Employment and Social Security Committee.

Syvret voiced concerns over nuclear power production in France. He clashed with local trade unions when he campaigned against the renewal of a lease to Shell for its aviation fuel depot at Jersey airport, in protest over the company's activities in Nigeria.

Svyret opposed proposals for the Limited Liability Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1997, which was sponsored by two UK accountants firms. During the debate, Syvret stated "Senator Jeune has, in his capacity as President of the Policy and Resources Committee, used his influence to speed up the Law Drafting process and get this matter brought through. He has spoken on this matter in the House and at Committee meetings, even though he has a financial interest in this matter". Reginald Jeune was a founding partner in one of Jersey's largest law firms Mourant, du Feu & Jeune. That firm was engaged by two accounting firms from the UK to assist them in getting this controversial law on the Statute book. Reginald Jeune had stood down as a partner for the law firm several years previously. It was not disputed that he was engaged as a Consultant by the law firm, and continued to have an office and secretary in the firms headquarters. He claimed that he did not know that his law firm was acting for Price Waterhouse, that his position in the law firm was an honorary one, and that his office and secretarial support from that law firm were to assist him in his States work. These claims were never investigated. The Bailiff Sir Philip Bailhache, as presiding officer of the States assembly, subsequently wrote to Syvret, referring to the standing order which stated "No Member shall impute improper motives to any other Member", saying "you have not provided me with any evidence to justify those imputations", inviting Syvret to discuss the matter, and giving notice that matter would be put to the States assembly after the summer recess. At the States assembly on 3 September 1996, Syvret refused to withdraw his statement, and was not allowed to speak. Members voted by 36 to 3 (with 4 abstentions) in favour of the proposition "That Mr. Syvret be suspended from the service of the States until he has withdrawn, by notice in writing to the Greffier, his imputations of improper motives against Senator Jeune". In an interview shortly afterwards, Syvret told "The Observer", "I was not allowed to defend myself. This is like something out of George Orwell's 1984... I was not allowed to defend myself, to speak on my behalf". UK MP Austin Mitchell described the States of Jersey's conduct in the matter as that of a "legislature for hire" and he sponsored an Early Day Motion in the UK Parliament critical of Syvret's suspension. The States of Jersey subsequently agreed to set up a committee of inquiry into procedural matters relating to the drafting of the legislation. On 4 March 1997, Svyret returned to address the States assembly and stated that he alleged only that Senator Jeune had breached Standing Orders 43 and 44 of the States of Jersey. As Syvret had not alleged improper motives against Senator Jeune he therefore could not withdraw an allegation which he had not made; Syvret left the States meeting and the States then resolved to censure him but to lift his suspension. In April 1998, Michael Beloff QC, sitting as a Commissioner of the Royal Court, struck out legal proceedings brought by Syvret challenging the legality of his suspension from the States assembly on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the legislature's internal procedures.

From 1999 to 2005, Syvret was President of the Health and Social Services Committee in the committee-based system of administration that existed at that time.

With the start of a new system of ministerial government in December 2005, Syvret was one of two candidates for the post of Chief Minister, along with Senator Frank Walker. In a secret ballot on 5 December 2005, the States' assembly elected Walker to be the first Chief Minister in Jersey history by 38 votes to Syvret's 14.

Syvret was, however, elected as Minister for Health and Social Services in the Council of Ministers. He was immediately faced with trying to resolve "a bitter dispute between nurses and health service management". In 2006, he proposed legislation to ban smoking in eating places and subsequently a ban on smoking in all enclosed workplaces. He opposed a policy for a new private hospital in St Helier. He was criticized by the Health and Social Services scrutiny panel for pressing ahead with plans to close two hospital wards and transfer patients to private care homes before the panel had completed its inquiry. He subsequently described the scrutiny report "a waste of time and money".

In October 2006, Syvret openly clashed with ministerial colleagues in a debate about whether to exempt food, medicine and other household necessities from the new General Sales Tax. In December 2006, he was reported to be disillusioned and considering stepping down from politics. Relations with ministerial colleagues continued to deteriorate: in February 2007, the Chief Minister called an emergency meeting of the full Council of Ministers to discuss an open letter Syvret had sent to a property developer who had proposed a private hospital in Jersey, in which Svyret had been critical of many aspects of government policy. The 3,000-word letter, which dealt with "environmental, taxation and social policies and the relationship between government and business", had initially been submitted to the "Jersey Evening Post" ("JEP") for publication "but rejected because editorially unacceptable conditions were attached"– though Syvret's letter was published in full by the "JEP" on 6 February 2007. On 8 February 2007, Walker and Syvret issued a joint statement that Syvret would be remaining a minister. The States Privileges and Procedure Committee commenced out an inquiry into whether Syvret had breached the code of conduct, prompting complaints about the way in which it was handling the case; Syvret walked out of the committee's private hearing, arguing that the proceedings were a breach of his human rights. On 2 March 2007, the committee cleared Syvret of breaching the members' code but the chairman of the committee instigated a debate in the States of Jersey assembly to express disapproval of Syvret's actions in relation to the open letter. Members (including Syvret himself) voted 29 to 8 to censure his actions.

In July 2007, returning to the States assembly after a period of illness, Syvret – answering a question to him in his role as minister – made scathing criticisms of officials in the Children's Service and other agencies for "bitterly failing" vulnerable young people. A week later, the Council of Ministers announced three investigations into whether the States were failing to protect children from abuse and neglect.

The following day, Syvret faced calls for his resignation as minister from the chair of the Jersey Child Protection Committee, who alleged that Syvret had breached data protection law relating to a child abuse victim (an allegation Syvret denied). Walker, the Chief Minister, also told Syvret to resign. In turn, Syvret dismissed the chair of the Jersey Child Protection Committee. In August 2007, Syvret's assistant minister resigned and relations between Syvret and senior officials were reported as being "at breaking point". Svyret wrote to 2,500 staff telling them they could "blow the whistle" on management anonymously. On 22 August, the Data Protection Commissioner determined that Syvret had broken data protection law by releasing "personal and highly sensitive information about a child who has been subjected to sexual abuse", a finding that Syvret rejected. The following day, the Council of Ministers announced that a former director of Devon County Social Services had been appointed to carry out a "wide ranging" inquiry into childcare and child protection in Jersey, which Syvret dismissed as having "absolutely no chance whatsoever of truly digging out and exposing all this issues".

On 12 September 2007, the States assembly held a six-hour debate on Chief Minister Frank Walker's proposition to dismiss Syvret from ministerial office, which Walker said was prompted solely by Syvret's "reprehensible behaviour in recent weeks". Members voted in favour of Syvret's dismissal by 35 to 15.

From September 2007 to April 2010, Syvret was a backbencher in the States assembly. On 5 December 2007, as "Father of the House", Syvret was called on to make what is usually a short and uncontroversial speech to mark the last sitting of the assembly before Christmas; instead Syvret made an emotional plea to Chief Minister Frank Walker and other politicians for being, Syvret claimed, complicit in covering up "decades of child abuse".

On 22 January 2008, Syvret launched a blog. Material published on the blog prompted an investigation commissioned by the States of Jersey Employment Board following complaints from civil servants that they were harassed. The report by Christopher Chapman found that Syvret had harassed States employees and that the Employment Board had not done enough to defend staff.

Other material posted on the blog by Syvret was to lead to his prosecution for breaches of the Jersey Data Protection Law over his naming of "Nurse M" (see below).

In February 2014, Google closed down the Stuart Syvret blog at the request of the Jersey authorities. A copy of the blog reappeared almost immediately on Blogger and later a new blog with the same title appeared, not hosted by Blogger.

In February 2008, a States of Jersey Police investigation into historic child abuse began to be widely reported in the news media around the world. Syvret and others called on the UK Home Secretary Jack Straw to appoint English prosecutors and judges to deal with what Syvret called "the child protection crisis". Syvret himself was criticized for declining assistance from a former head of New Scotland Yard's paedophile unit during his tenure as health minister. In May 2008, Syvret made a formal complaint to the police claiming that senior civil servants had perverted the course of justice by covering up abuse of children in care homes.

During 2008, an independent report by Alan Williamson commissioned by the States in response to Syvret's claims concluded that no children in care in Jersey were currently at risk, while a review by the Howard League for Penal Reform was critical of the regime that had operated at Greenfields, one of the island's children's homes, during Syvret's time as minister.

In June 2008 Syvret brought a vote of no confidence against the Council of Ministers in relation to the Waterfront (a major development in St Helier) – it was defeated by 41 votes to eight.

In July 2008, Syvret and UK Liberal Democrat MP John Hemming began preparations to seek judicial review in London of what they saw as Jack Straw's failure to ensure that Jersey's authorities protected child abuse victims. In March 2009, the Administrative Court refused permission for the case to proceed to a full hearing. Syvret subsequently complained that the hearing was a "farrago", the two judges (Lord Justice Richards and Mr Justice Tugendhat)–who he described as "Allies of the Jersey oligarchy" – were biased and that the High Court hearing was "absurdly short", resulting in "a clear breach of British jurisprudence and of Article 6 of the ECHR".

Syvret's robust dealings with fellow States members continued in August 2008, when he compared a Jewish senator to a Nazi war criminal in an argument about General Sales Tax. Syvret was at the receiving end of barbed comments in March 2009, when Senator Jim Perchard, the Health Minister, told Svyret to consider committing suicide – a comment that led to Perchard's resignation.

In March 2009, it was reported that the States of Jersey Police were reviewing an earlier investigation into allegations that a nurse had killed many patients at Jersey's General Hospital, following claims made by Syvret on his blog. The blog article, the Jersey Court of Appeal later explained
On 6 April 2009, ten police officers went to Syvret's home, where they arrested him and carried out an extensive search of the property. Syvret was held in custody for seven hours and questioned about alleged breaches of Jersey data protection law in relation to his naming of "Nurse M". The "Jersey Evening Post" criticized police tactics, as did MPs in the UK Parliament. An emergency sitting of the States assembly was called – though the assembly subsequently voted against a proposition critical of the police's actions. Svyret's lawyer complained that data protection laws were being used to restrict his freedom of expression, contrary to human rights. In 2011, the police conceded that the arrest could have been handled better.

On 18 June 2009, Syvret appeared before at the Magistrate's Court charged with driving without a valid licence between September 2006 and April 2008. On 9 July 2009, Syvret was charged with breaches of data protection laws relating to his blog article about "Nurse M". Syvret pleaded not guilty and argued that his prosecution was an abuse of process and the charges should be struck out. On 22 July 2009 the prosecuting advocate stated the case against Mr Syvret which included the allegation – "Mr. Syvret’s comments on the blog were to the effect that Nurse # was clearly a dangerous homicidal maniac and that investigation into him had been stopped for political or corrupt reasons, leaving the people of Jersey in danger. In fact the May 1999 report was followed by intensive police investigation authorised by the Attorney General. An extremely experienced police officer Mr. Faudemer led that investigation for the police, and the investigation concluded that there was insufficient evidence against Nurse #, and Nurse # was never charged. Mr. Syvret did not make any of this clear on his blog and does not appear to have troubled to find out the full facts in advance."

The proceedings were to turn out to be lengthy involving: 20 separate hearings in the Magistrate's Court lasting 35 days in total, nine hearings in the Royal Court lasting 15 days, and three days in the Jersey Court of Appeal. Throughout the proceedings Syvret repeatedly complained that he was not being given relevant evidence by the prosecution. Matters came to head in October when Syvret submitted evidence to the court which he asserted proved that the 1999 police investigation had been a "catastrophic failure". The prosecuting advocate argued indirectly that the quality of the investigation was not relevant. On 12 October 2009 the Magistrate stated "I think the case would probably benefit from some clarity from both sides on exactly what the allegations are and what the defence is." Syvret stated " it is abundantly clear that the 1999 investigation was in fact catastrophically defective, indeed far, far more so and more alarmingly so than even I originally thought. This has belatedly become known to the Crown, they have recognised this, they now see that they have no remote case against my public interest disclosure argument. So now at this 59th minute of the 11th hour they are trying to rule inadmissible
that entire argument that the Defence case has been built on and has been established on for the recent months". He stated that the court was going to rule against him,as the court eventually did. He stated: "Well I have to make it plain now, you will have to instruct the police to arrest me because I’m not turning up before this court any further" After this hearing Syvret was offered the services of an experienced advocate assigned to him under the island's legal aid scheme. He declined the offer.

The data protection charge was brought under Article 55 of the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005, which creates the offence of disclosing personal data but permits disclosure where it is "necessary for the purposing preventing crime" or is "justified as being in the public interest". During the lengthy proceedings, Sir Christopher Pitcher sitting as a Commissioner of the Royal Court explained the legal issues at stake: Syvret was, the Commissioner said,
Throughout the proceedings, Syvret claimed that identifying "Nurse M" was justified in the public interest "to get the authorities moving in relation to minimising the risk that Nurse M presents" and "to alert the Jersey public to the risk" Nurse M presented (in particular to avoid his being employed as a nurse in a private care home). These public interest justifications were rejected in the Magistrate's Court and, on appeal, by the Royal Court.

At the outset of the proceedings, Syvret made an application to the Royal Court in August 2009, arguing that the Assistant Magistrate was biased against him, as was the Commissioner of the Royal Court hearing that application. Sir Richard Tucker rejected these submissions and ordered him to pay costs. When the case resumed in the Magistrate's Court, Syvret sought to call the Attorney General, several senior civil servants, the suspended police chief Graham Power and other police officers, and Deputy Carolyn Labey (his former partner) as witnesses.

Syvret's arrest was ordered on 23 October 2009 when he failed to attend court for the second time that week, having traveled to London where he said he was claiming "legal asylum". He returned to Jersey more than six months later on 4 May 2010 and was arrested and bailed.

When the case resumed in the Magistrate's Court in August 2010, Syvret told the court that he was suffering from clinical depression and sought an adjournment of the proceedings.

On 4 September 2010, Syvret appealed to the Jersey Court of Appeal against the Royal Court's ruling in August 2009. Miss Clare Montgomery QC, sitting as Court of Appeal judge, refused leave to appeal, holding that "the Commissioner was right not to recuse himself".

On 27 September 2010 Syvret applied to the Royal Court for judicial review of the continuing prosecution; the application was refused. (An appeal against this decision was refused in July 2011).

On 14 October 2010, Syvret was convicted by the Magistrate's Court of the motoring offences, when the Assistant Magistrate criticized the police as overreacting in the way they arrested Syvret. On 17 November 2010, the court found Syvret guilty of the data protection offences and guilty of contempt of court on account of his non-attendance and words of disrespect. The prosecuting Attorney General made two charges against Syvret for the aforementioned blogging of the Faudemer Report. The charges came under the Data Protection (Jersey) Law, Articles 55, 17, and 21. The opinion on these two charges by Assistant Magistrate Mrs B. Shaw of the Magistrate's Court was published online. Syvret refused the option of community service and was jailed for ten weeks, fined £4,200 and ordered to pay £10,000 in legal costs. He was granted bail by the Royal Court the following day, pending an appeal. On 17 June 2011, Syvret made a further claim for judicial review to the Royal Court relating to the prosecution. The application was refused by Commissioner Pitchers and an appeal to the Jersey Court of Appeal (consisting of Michael Beloff QC, Clare Montgomery QC and Christopher Nugee QC) was dismissed.

Syvret's appeal against conviction to the Royal Court, Commissioner Sir Christopher Pitchers presiding, started on 1 August 2011. Syvret maintained that he was protecting the public by naming "Nurse M" on his blog and argued that the motive of the police in searching his home when he was arrested was to find evidence to discredit former police chief Graham Power and former deputy police chief Lenny Harper. The Royal Court repeated criticisms of the police actions in raiding Syvrets' home, arresting him and keeping him in custody. The court also held that in the Magistrate's Court the prosecution "lead some evidence which went further than was necessary in supporting the robustness of the 1999 enquiry" but found that the Assistant Magistrate's conclusions had not been influenced by this. The court rejected Syvret's submissions that disclosure of the nurses' names was justified as being in the public interest. The court added that "The public interest is served by measured, responsible and accurate reporting. The way that the appellant dealt with the information that he had was none of these". The court dismissed Syvret's appeal on the data protection offences but allowed his appeal in relation to two counts of contempt of court.

Syvret indicated that he was now prepared to accept community service and was sentenced to 80 hours for contempt of the Magistrate's Court. The fine was reduced to £1,400 and legal costs to £5,000. However, by early November 2011, Syvret had not carried out any of the community service sentence, and on 2 November 2011 he was re-sentenced by the Magistrate to eight weeks in prison; Syvret's appeal to the Royal Court was dismissed, as was a subsequent application to reopen the appeal. The jail sentence was extended by a further month and six days for non-payment of the fine. He was released from prison on 30 December 2011.

The Jersey Data Protection Commissioner described the conviction as "an historic landmark in the international world of data protection, as it is the first of its kind relating to the publication of personal data via an internet blog". In September 2011, in response to a question, the Attorney General told the States assembly that prosecution legal costs were £384,000. Syvret has stated that he intends to take his case to the European Court of Human Rights. In the House of Commons, an Early Day Motion sponsored by John Hemming MP critical of Syvret's imprisonment attracted only two signatures.

In 2010, Syvret commenced a civil action in the Royal Court against the Chief Minister, the States Employment Board and the Attorney General of Jersey. He sought damages for harm suffered as a result of his dismissal as a minister in 2007 which he argued left him to "shoulder and carry the burden – virtually single-handedly, of investigating many examples of child protection failure and concealed child abuse". Jonathan Sumption, sitting as a Commissioner of the Royal Court, struck out his case.

On 10 April 2007 the "Jersey Evening Post" reported that Syvret had accused the Tax Justice Network of blackmailing him, an accusation strongly denied. Senator Syvret complained to the police, but subsequently stated the matter was not worth pursuing.