When was evidence of the Catopsbaatar first found?

Catopsbaatar is a genus of multituberculate, an extinct order of rodent-like mammals. It lived in what is now Mongolia during the late Campanian age of the Late Cretaceous Period, about 72 million years ago. The first fossils were collected in the early 1970s, and the animal was named as a new species of the genus "Djadochtatherium " in 1974, "D. catopsaloides". The specific name refers to the animal's similarity to the genus "Catopsalis". The species was moved to the genus "Catopsalis" in 1979, and received its own genus ("Catopsbaatar", Greek and Mongolian for "visible hero") in 1994. Five skulls, one molar, and one skeleton with a skull are known; the latter is the genus' most complete specimen. "Catopsbaatar" was a member of the family Djadochtatheriidae.

Catopsbaatar

The skull of "Catopsbaatar" was up to long and, as in other multituberculates, proportionally large. The external appearance of their heads may have been similar to those of rodents. The skull was heavy-set and wide, with the zygomatic arches strongly expanded to the sides. The eye sockets were smaller and placed further back than in its relatives, and the snout was more elongated. "Catopsbaatar" had semicircular ridges on the side of the skull, to which the jaw muscles were attached. The mandible was strong and very elongated. It had very robust incisors, and cheek teeth with multiple cusps (for which multituberculates are named). The pelvic bones differed from those of other multituberculates in that they were not fused to each other. "Catopsbaatar" had spurs on its ankles, like those of the male platypus and echidna, without evidence of a venom canal (present in the former).

The spurs of "Catopsbaatar" and other Mesozoic mammals may have been used for protection against theropod dinosaurs and other predators. Multituberculates are thought to have given live birth, and the fact that they had hair indicates that they were homeothermic ("warmblooded"). Multituberculates would have been omnivorous; "Catopsbaatar" had powerful jaw muscles, and its incisors were well adapted for gnawing hard seeds, using a backwards chewing stroke. Multituberculates are thought to have had a sprawling posture, and "Catopsbaatar" may have been able to jump. "Catopsbaatar" is known from the Red Beds of Hermiin Tsav and the Barun Goyot Formation in Mongolia, which are thought to be the same geologic age (about 72 million years old).

In 1970 and 1971, the Polish-Mongolian Palaeontological Expeditions collected mammalian fossils from the Red Beds of Hermiin Tsav formation in Mongolia's Gobi Desert. About 100 specimens, recovered from four localitions, are housed at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. Two-thirds of the collected specimens were multituberculates: an extinct order of mammals with rodent-like dentition, named for the numerous cusps (or tubercles) on their molars. In 1974, Polish palaeontologist Zofia Kielan-Jaworowska named a new species of the Mongolian multituberculate genus "Djadochtatherium" as "D. catopsaloides", with specimen ZPAL MgM−I/78 from the Polish collection as the holotype. The specific name refers to the animal's similarity to the North American species "Catopsalis joyneri", which Kielan-Jaworowska thought was a possible descendant. The specimen, collected at the Hermiin Tsav I location, is an almost-complete skull of a juvenile with portions of the cranium damaged. Kielan-Jaworowska also assigned other specimens to the species: a damaged skull missing lower jaws (ZPAL MgM−I/79, an adult), a skull with partial lower jaws (ZPAL MgM−I/80), and a molar with a fragment of jaw (ZPAL MgM−I/159 from the Barun Goyot Formation of Khulsan, the only specimen not from Hermiin Tsav).

Kielan-Jaworowska and American palaeontologist Robert E. Sloan considered the genus "Djadochtatherium" a junior synonym of "Catopsalis", and created the new combination "C. catopsaloides" in 1979. American palaeontologists Nancy B. Simmons and Miao Desui conducted a 1986 cladistic analysis which indicated that "Catopsalis" was a paraphyletic taxon (an unnatural grouping of species), and "C. catopsaloides" required its own generic name. Kielan-Jaworowska followed Simmons and Miao's suggestion, moving "C. catopsaloides" to its own monotypic genus ("Catopsbaatar") in 1994. "Catops" is derived from the Greek word "katoptos" ("visible" or "evident"); "baatar" is Mongolian for "hero", and the name refers to "Catopsbaatar"'s similarity to the genus "Catopsalis" (as is the case for the specific name). The name "Catopsalis" itself consists of the Greek words for "visible" and "cutting shears" ("psalis").
Later in 1994, Kielan-Jaworowska and the Russian palaeontologist Petr P. Gambaryan mentioned caudal (tail) vertebrae which may have belonged to "Catopsbaatar"; this attribution is uncertain, since they may instead belong to the related "Tombaatar" (named in 1997). A fourth skull (PIN 4537/4, a juvenile), discovered during the 1975 Soviet−Mongolian Expedition, was mentioned by Gambaryan and Kielan-Jaworowska in 1995. Canadian palaontologist Phillip J. Currie found a new "Catopsbaatar" specimen during the 1999 Dinosaurs of the Gobi expedition, organised by the American Nomadic Expeditions Company. Housed at the Mongolian Academy of Sciences in Ulaanbaatar as PM120/107, this most completely preserved known specimen consists of the complete skull (which may be slightly flattened) and partial skeleton of an adult individual. The specimen has rather complete fore- and hind limbs, which were unknown for the genus until then and which are generally rarely preserved in multituberculates. Its pelvic ilia were stolen and destroyed by a schoolboy on tour at the Natural History Museum of Oslo, when it was prepared in 2000. The specimen was reported in 2002 by Kielan-Jaworowska, Norwegian palaeontologist Jørn Hurum, Currie and Mongolian palaeontologist Rinchen Barsbold, who also mentioned another skull (PIN 4537/5, a juvenile) found during the 1975 expedition. "Catopsalis joyneri", the basis of the name "C. catopsaloides", was moved to the new genus "Valenopsalis" in 2015.

"Catopsbaatar" belonged to the order Multituberculata, a group within Allotheria (an infraclass of mammals outside Theria, the group that contains modern placentals and marsupials). Multituberculates are characterized by having premolars and molars with multiple low cusps, arranged in longitudal rows. Multituberculates are the best-known group of mammals from the Mesozoic Era, when the dinosaurs dominated; although the earliest multituberculate remains are from the Jurassic Period, the group is known as recently as the Eocene Epoch (thereby surviving the Cretaceous–Palaeogene extinction event). The group may have become extinct due to competition with eutherian mammals, such as rodents. Multituberculates were mainly known from teeth and jaws until the 1920s, when more complete specimens were discovered—first in Asia, and then elsewhere. Postcranial bones (the rest of the skeleton, other than the skull) remain rare.

Kielan-Jaworowska originally classfied "Catopsbaatar" as a member of the multituberculate family Taeniolabididae in 1974. In 1994, she suggested that "Djadochtatherium" was close to "Catopsbaatar" ancestry. She and Hurum named a new family of multituberculates, Djadochtatheriidae (which they placed in the new suborder Djadochtatheria), in 1997. The family included the genera "Djadochtatherium", "Catopsbaatar", "Kryptobaatar", and "Tombaatar", all from the Gobi Desert. The family differs from other multituberculates (and other mammals) in that the front margins of its snout were confluent with the zygomatic arches (cheekbones), giving the snout a trapezoid shape when seen from above. In general, other mammals have snouts where the side margins are curved inward in front of the zygomatic arches. Kielan-Jaworowska and Hurum revised the higher ranks within Multituberculata in 2001, replacing the suborder Djadochtatheria with the superfamily Djadochtatherioidea (placed in the suborder Cimolodonta).
The following cladogram shows the placement of "Catopsbaatar" among other multituberculates according to Kielan-Jaworowska and Hurum, 1997:
The most complete adult "Catopsbaatar" skull (specimen PM 120/107) is long and wide, with a lower jaw. By comparison, the skull of the juvenile holotype (ZPAL MgM−I/78) is about long and wide, with a lower jaw. The largest adult skull (ZPAL MgM−I/79) is long but, since it is incomplete, its other measurements are unknown. "Catopsbaatar" was larger than its relatives, "Kryptobaatar" and "Djadochtatherium". Multituberculates had relatively large skulls and short necks; their skulls were proportionally longer and wider than those of similarly sized rodents and marsupials. The external appearance of their heads may have been similar to those of rodents.

The skull of "Catopsbaatar" was heavy-set, with a wide margin across the front. It was shorter along the midline than at the sides, because the nuchal crest at the back of the head curved inwards at the middle, creating an indention at the hind margin of the skull when viewed from above. The zygomatic arches were strongly expanded to the sides, with the skull width (across the arches) about 85 percent of the skull length. The front of the orbits (eye sockets) were further back than in other djadochtatheriids, resulting in a more elongated snout (65 percent of the skull length) and small orbits. The premaxilla (front bone of the upper jaw) extended less than two-thirds of the length of the snout in front of the eyes, shorter than that of "Kryptobaatar". The premaxilla consisted of parts of the face and the palate; djadochtatheriids had a premaxillary ridge on the boundary between the two (visible when viewing the skull from below). The palatal part of the premaxilla was concave, with many randomly arranged nutrient foramina (openings). The nasal bone—which formed the upper part of the snout—was relatively wide (becoming wider towards the back), and its front was covered with irregularly spaced vascular foramina. The suture between the nasal and frontal bones was less pointed forwards in the middle than were those of "Catopsbaatar"'s relatives.
The maxilla (the main part of the upper jaw) was extensive, and formed most of the side of the snout. It contained all the upper teeth, except the incisors. The infraorbital foramina (openings at the lower front of the maxilla) were slit-like in some specimens and rounded in others, and varied in number from one to three. One of the most characteristic features of the face of "Catopsbaatar" was the very large anterior zygomatic ridge on the sides of the upper jaw (a site for jaw-muscle attachment). It was much higher than in other djadochtatheriids except for "Djadochtatherium", from which it differed in that the ridge was semicircular rather than roughly trapezoidal (other genera have elliptical ridges). The front margin of the anterior zygomatic ridge was thickened, which produced a bulge on the side margin of the snout when viewed from the side and above. The lower part of the suture between the maxilla and the squamosal bone extended along the hind border of the anterior zygomatic ridge. The palatal processes of the maxilla formed most of the palate. The major palatine foramina had shallow grooves extending forward. The postpalatine torus (a bony protrusion on the palate) of "Catopsbaatar" was less prominent than was that of "Tombaatar". The frontal bone was large, and formed most of the cranial roof. The suture between the frontal and parietal bones formed a U-shaped part in the middle which pointed backwards—similar to the condition in "Kryptobaatar" but less deep, with smaller U-shaped structures at the sides. This differed from "Djadochtatherium", which had a narrower V-shaped suture between the frontal and parietal bones.
The intermediate zygomatic ridge on the squamosal bone (also for jaw-muscle attachment) was much smaller and lower than the anterior zygomatic ridge in front of it. "Catopsbaatar" differed from other djadochtatheriids in that the intermediate ridge contacted the anterior ridge with its front edge. The posterior zygomatic ridge at the lower back of the squamosal bone was the weakest of the three ridges, and only marked by a depression. The postorbital processes behind the orbit on the parietal bone were very long, and the parietal ridges extended from the hind margin of the postorbital processes towards each other (but without reaching). The nuchal crest was very prominent, and extended to the sides to form "wings". The occipital plate was almost vertical and slightly concave, and was obscured by the nuchal crest when the skull was viewed from above. Though incompletely preserved, it is assumed that the occipital plate sloped back and upwards from the occipital condyles (as in some relatives). The orbito-temporal vascular system inside the skull of "Catopsbaatar" did not differ much from those of related genera.

"Catopsbaatar" mandible was robust and very elongated. The diastema (gap between the front and cheek teeth) was concave, and extended for 20 percent of the dentary bone (the main bone of the lower jaw). Seen from above, the diastema formed a wide shelf which sloped downwards on the inner side of the jaw. The small mental foramen was close to the upper middle margin of the diastema. The coronoid process of the mandible appears to have been relatively longer and narrower than in other djadochtatherioideans. It was separated from the alveolar process (where the teeth are contained) by a wide groove. The mandibular condyle (which articulated with the skull) was slightly above the level of the molars. The front part of the masseretic crest was very prominent, forming a bulge known as a masseretic protuberance. The robustness of this crest and the presence of the protuberance varies among related genera. The masseteric fovea (pit) in front of the masseteric fossa was probably more distinct than in other djadochtatherioids. Each half of the mandibular symphysis (where the two halves of the mandible connect) was shaped like an upside-down teardrop. The pterygoid fossa on the inner side of the mandible was very large, and occupied most of the hind part of the dentary. The lower part of this fossa had a boundary, known as the pterygoideus shelf.

The dental formula (the number of teeth of each type in the tooth row of a mammal) of "Catopsbaatar" was (two incisors, no canines, three premolars and two molars in half of the upper tooth row, and one incisor, no canines, two premolars and two molars in half of the lower). By comparison, the dental formula of humans is. Each tooth in a mammal is designated with a letter and number by position (I for incisor, C for canine, P for premolar, M for molar); the letters are capitalised for the teeth of the upper jaw, but not for those in the lower jaw. The cusp formula shows the arrangement and number of cusps in consecutive rows of a tooth, from the outer to the inner side; each row is separated by a colon.

Being a cimolodont, "Catopsbaatar" did not have I1 incisors. The I2 upper-front incisors of "Catopsbaatar" were very robust and had a sharply limited band of enamel. The two incisors converged slightly towards the middle, touching each other. The smaller I3 incisor behind was cone-shaped. The alveolus (tooth socket) of "Catopsbaatar"'s I3 incisor was formed by the premaxilla, rather than the premaxilla and maxilla (unlike in "Tombaatar"). The front upper premolars P1 and P3 were only present in juveniles (deciduous), disappearing (with their alveoli) in older individuals. P1 appears to have had two cusps, was single-rooted, and had a cone-like, blunt crown. P3 was single-rooted and smaller than P1. The cusp formula of the P4 premolar was 5−4:1, the central cusp being the largest. The P4 of "Catopsbaatar" was almost trapezoidal in shape (unlike in "Djadochtatherium" and "Kryptobaatar", where it is crescent-shaped), smaller, and lacking ridges. "Catopsbaatar" also differed by only having three upper premolars, lacking the P2 (a feature shared with "Tombaatar"). Other mammals usually evolve the loss of teeth at the beginning or end of a tooth row, not in the middle (as in multituberculates). The cusp formula of the M1 molar was 5−6:5−6:4, with the inner ridge extending about 75 percent of the tooth's length. The cusps of M1 were sharp and unworn in juveniles, but worn and concave in older animals. The cusp formula of the M2 molar was 2:2−3:2−3.

"Catopsbaatar" had a single lower pair of incisors, characteristic of multituberculates, which was very strong and compressed sideways. It had a sharply limited band of enamel, and grew continually. The p3 premolar was very small, and adhered entirely to the lower diastema under the larger p4. The blade-like p4 was roughly trapezoidal in side view, and had three cusps along the horizontal upper margin and one cusp on the outer back side. The p4 did not have the ridges on the outer and inner side, as are present in other multituberculates. The m1 molar was almost symmetrical, and its cusp formula was 4:4, the size of the cusps decreasing towards the back. The m2 had a cusp formula of 2−3:2, most specimens being 2:2. The cusps on the inner side were wider than those on the outer side, the inner row of cusps was shorter than the outer one, and the hind margin of the tooth was arranged obliquely.

The only "Catopsbaatar" specimen which preserves the postcranial skeleton is PM120/107, which is fragmentary. It includes elements which are unknown, or incompletely preserved, in other multituberculates. One lumbar vertebra (the fifth or sixth, from between the rib cage and the pelvis) had a spinous process which was stout in side view and long when seen from above. The clavicle was slightly less curved than that of "Kryptobaatar" (resembling a bent rod which widened at each end), and measured about. The upper part of the scapulocoracoid was relatively wide in side view, and the lower part was very narrow. It was probably about long when complete. The preserved part of the humerus (upper arm bone) was about long. Its shaft was triangular in cross-section, relatively narrow when seen from above, and most of its width was occupied by the intertubercular groove. This groove was delimited on the side by the crest of the greater tubercle, whose middle part formed the deltopectoral crest. The ulnar condyle, where the ulna of the lower arm articulated with the humerus, was more prominent than the radial condyle (where the radius articulated), oval, and delimited from the radial condyle by a groove. The radius was about long, with a prominent head. Its shaft was smooth, compressed from top to bottom, and oval in cross-section. The ulna was compressed sideways, flatter than the radius, and about long as preserved.
The contact from the ischium to the ilium and pubis of the pelvis was not fused, and the front end of the ischium formed a rugose suture. The pubis was roughly triangular, with a rough suture for the ilium above and a deep groove for the ischium at the lower front. Specimen PM120/107's pelvic bones differed from those of other multituberculates in not being fused together. The presence of sutures in the pelvis of PM120/107 indicates that it was a juvenile, although the skull appears adult; the meaning of this discrepancy is unknown. The femur (thigh bone) was proportionally similar to that of "Eucosmodon" and "Nemegtbaatar"—smaller than the former, but larger than the latter. The femur was stout relative to its length, and it may have been about long. The tibia of the lower leg was about long. Seen from behind the upper side, the tibia had a deep excavation (cavity) which may be characteristic of multituberculates.

Unlike most other multituberculates and other mammals, the calcaneus bone at the back of the foot had a short tuber calcanei (like some tree kangaroos), with an expanded, anvil-shaped proximal process strongly bent downwards and to the side. "Catopsbaatar" had an os calcaris bone on the inner side of its ankle, a feature also seen in modern male monotremes (the platypus and the echidna) and other Mesozoic mammals. The os calcaris bone was plate-like and rectangular in outline; as in monotremes, it supported the cornu calcaris in forming a spur on the outer side of the tarsus (cluster of foot bones). Unlike with other Mesozoic mammals, these two elements were not fused together in multituberculates. The cornu calcaris was triangular, with a concavity in the middle, and was long. The spur was flattened, and was thicker at its conjunction with the os calcaris (where they connected via several ridges). As the spur of PM120/107 may have been moved from its original position, it is unknown whether it faced inwards (like in the platypus). Unlike in the platypus, there was no impression of a canal for venom. The cornu calcaris of "Catopsbaatar" was ossified (turned into bone) and would have been covered in keratin (the horny covering seen in nails and hoofs). The cornu calcaris of the platypus consists only of keratin, and is hollow.

Hurum, Zhe-Xi Luo, and Kielan-Jaworowska suggested in 2006 that the spurs on the ankles of Mesozoic mammals (such as "Catopsbaatar") were homologous with those of monotremes, and were a basal (or "primitive") feature lost by later therian mammals. The male platypus uses the spur to deliver venom from a gland, but it is unknown if the extinct groups were venomous as well. Mesozoic mammals were mostly small (with exceptions such as the fox-sized "Repenomamus") and, although they were too small to be prey for large theropod dinosaurs, smaller theropods, large lizards, crocodiles, and birds could have fed on them. For example, mammal jaws have been found in the abdomen of a specimen of the small theropod "Sinosauropteryx"; the jaws belonged to "Zhangheotherium", which also had spurs, and the multituberculate "Sinobaatar". Since dinosaurs dominated Earth during the Mesozoic, this period has been called the "dark ages" of mammalian history. The spur, which would have been more effective if venomous, was probably used as a defensive weapon by small, early mammals. It could also have been used during intraspecific competition or predation.
The pelvic bones of "Catopsbaatar" specimen PM120/107 may not have been fused because fusion occurred late in development, because it was a sexually dimorphic feature only occurring in males (unfused pelvic bones might have enabled expansion of the birth canal in females), or pelvic fusion may be a taxonomic difference between "Catopsbaatar" and other multituberculates. Unlike with other mammals, the pelvis of multituberculates was very narrow; in other genera where the pelvis is known, each half of the pubis and ischium were fused together, forming a keel. The length and rigidity of the keel indicate that the pelvis could not have spread during birth. Because there would be little space for the passage of an egg (egg-laying monotremes have wide ischial archs), Kielan-Jaworowska suggested in 1979 that multituberculates were viviparous (gave live birth) and that the newborns were extremely small—similar to those of marsupials.

Hair, structurally similar to that of modern mammals and associated with bones of the Mongolian multituberculate "Lambdopsalis", has been identified in coprolites (fossilised feces) of carnivorous mammals from the Palaeocene Epoch. This indicates that multituberculates had hair for insulation, similar to modern mammals (and possibly fossil mammals), a feature probably related to homeothermy (warm-bloodedness).

Although multituberculates were thought to have been carnivores or herbivores, since American palaeontologist William A. Clemens and Kielan-Jaworowska suggested modern rat kangaroos as analogues for the group in 1979 they have been considered omnivores (feeding on both plants and animals). Uniquely among mammals, multituberculates employed a backward chewing stroke which resulted in the masticatory muscles—the muscles which move the mandible—being inserted more to the front than in other groups (including rodents). Gambaryan and Kielan-Jaworowska reconstructed the masticatory musculature of various multituberculates in 1995, and found that "Catopsbaatar" and its relatives had very powerful masticatory musculature, due to their high zygomatic arches and large anterior and intermediate zygomatic ridges and coronoid processes. Their powerful incisors, with limited bands of enamel, would have been well adapted to gnawing and to cutting hard seeds (similar to rodents). Since it was larger than some other multituberculates, "Catopsbaatar" would only have to open its mouth 25 degrees to crush hard seeds in diameter; a 40-degree gape would have caused dislocation. After the incisors cut, the premolars and molars would begin to grind with a "power stroke".
According to Gambaryan and Kielan-Jaworowska, the adaptation for crushing hard seeds sometimes—as in "Catopsbaatar"—opposed the benefit of a low condylar process (which discourages mandibular dislocation). The anterior and intermediate zygomatic ridges of the skull were the origin of the superficial masseter muscle, which facilitates chewing. The separation of the origin of this muscle into two parts and the rounded muscle scars left by them are unique among mammals to multituberculates. The masticatory muscles of multituberculates independently evolved features shared with rodents and small herbivorous marsupials. As with rodents, multituberculates may have been capable of bilateral mastication—where both rows of teeth in the mandible perform the same function simultaneously—and unilateral mastication (where the rows on one side are used).

The limb posture of multituberculates has been debated. According to some researchers, they employed a parasagittal stance with the erect limbs under the body; others consider a sprawling stance more likely. Kielan-Jaworowska and Hurum supported the latter theory in 2006 based on the presence of hind-leg spurs, a feature they considered present only in sprawling mammals. They pointed out that all early mammals preserved in lacustrine (lake) deposits were compressed from top to bottom, suggesting a sprawling stance, whereas later mammals were preserved on their flanks. Earlier arguments for a sprawling stance include deep pelvises and features of the legs. They also suggested that the feet of multituberculates would have been plantigrade (the sole touching the ground) at rest, but digitigrade (the sole not touching the ground) when jumping and running quickly; they dismissed the idea that the forelimbs of multituberculates and other early mammals were more parasagittal than their hindlimbs. Kielan-Jaworowska and Hurum depicted "Catopsbaatar" with plantigrade, sprawling legs, with mobile spurs which pointed inward when preparing for attack.

In 2008, Kielan-Jaworowska and Hurum suggested that the long spinous process on a "Catopsbaatar" vertebra and the long transverse processes in "Nemegtbaatar" may indicate that some multituberculates were saltatorial (had the ability to jump). "Catopsbaatar" probably had strong muscles attaching to the tuber calcanei, which further supports the jumping hypothesis. Although it has been suggested that multituberculates were arboreal (lived in trees), most Asian taxa were probably terrestrial; some others were fossorial, digging and living underground.

All specimens of "Catopsbaatar" are known from the Red Beds of Hermiin Tsav formation, except for one molar from the Barun Goyot Formation. The formations are considered coeval (of the same geological age), contain many of the same animals, and probably date to the late Campanian age of the Late Cretaceous Period (about 72 million years ago). The rock facies of the Red Beds of Hermiin Tsav formation consist of orange-coloured, thick-bedded sandstone, with a thin interbedding of light-coloured silt stones and claystones. The rock facies of the Barun Goyot Formation are considered to be the result of an arid or semi-arid environment, with aeolian (deposited by wind) beds.

Other known mammals from the Red Beds of Hermiin Tsav include the multituberculates "Nemegtbaatar", "Chulsanbaatar" and "Nessovbaatar", and the therians "Deltatheridium", "Asioryctes", and "Barunlestes". Dinosaurs include "Ajancingenia", "Velociraptor", "Saichania", "Platyceratops", "Gobiceratops", and some indeterminate theropods. Reptiles include the turtle "Mongolemys", the lizards "Gobinatus", "Tchingisaurus", "Prodenteia", "Gladidenagama" and "Phrynosomimus", and an indeterminate crocodile. The frog "Gobiates" and an indeterminate alexornithiform bird are also known. Ostracods include "Limnocythere", "Cypridea", and "Eucypris".


Is Bolivia a poor country?

Bolivia was hit with hyperinflation as well. During the 1980s, economist Jeffrey Sachs was sent as a consultant and new President Gonzalo Sànchez de Lozada reined in inflation in the 1990s by severely cutting government spending. While Bolivia remained a very poor country, the authors argue that it is better off now because its inflation was curtailed. They also argue that Bolivia's example vindicates the bad reputation free-market economics acquired in Chile as Bolivia's reforms came after a democratic election.

The Commanding Heights

The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy is a book by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw first published as "The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World" in 1998. In 2002, it was adapted as a documentary of the same title and later released on DVD.

"The Commanding Heights" attempts to trace the rise of free markets during the last century as well as the process of globalization. The book attributes the origin of the phrase commanding heights to a speech by Vladimir Lenin referring to the control of perceived key segments of a national economy.

The authors take the thesis that prior to World War I the world effectively lived in a state of globalization, which they term the First Era of Globalization. The authors define globalization as periods when free markets predominate and countries place few if any limits on exports, immigration, imports, or exchanges of information. Overall, they see globalization as a positive movement that improves the standard of living for all the people connected to it—from the richest to poorest. According to the authors, the rise of communism and fascism, not to mention the Great Depression, nearly extinguished capitalism, which rapidly lost popularity. After World War II, the authors note that the work of economist John Maynard Keynes came to be widely accepted in Western economies. Keynes believed in government regulation of the economy and the authors underline this as Keynes' great influence and prestige. In the authors' opinion, these so-called commanding heights were often owned or severely regulated by governments in accordance with Keynes' ideas.
The authors then discuss how the political changes of the 1980s ushered in accompanying changes in economic policy. The old trend changed when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and when Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States. Both these leaders parted ways with Keynesian economics and they rather governed more in the tradition of the works of Friedrich Hayek, who opposed government regulation, tariffs and other infringements on a pure free market; and of Milton Friedman, who emphasized the futility of using inflationary monetary policies to influence rates of economic growth. In practice, Hayek's policies were applied only selectively as Reagan's 1986 income tax reforms substantially increased taxes on the lowest quintile of wage-earners while dramatically decreasing rates for the upper two quintiles. In contrast to Hayek's, Reagan's policies also continued and expanded tax write-offs, rebates and subsidies for many large corporations.. Friedman's monetarism was also abandoned in practice as government-issued debt as a percentage of GDP rose dramatically throughout the 1980s. While Thatcher, Reagan and their successors made sweeping reforms, the authors argue that the current era of globalization finally began around 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, they assert countries embracing free markets have prospered on the whole while those adhering to central planning have failed.

While strongly in favor of this trend, the authors worry that globalization will not last. More specifically, they believe that if inequality in economic growth remains high and if Third World nations are not offered the proper opportunities and incentives to support capitalism, the movement will end just as the first era did. The reason the authors place so much emphasis on narrowing economic gaps is because they believe against many of the people they interview that there is no ideological support for capitalism, only the pragmatic fact that the system works better than any other as they remark the following:

Within the book, the authors examine briefly many different nations and regions and their economic development since World War II (in the case of industrialized countries they often begin before the war). While they admit that the book cannot touch on every single aspect (Yergin remarks that the topic of their book constitutes an entire new academic discipline), they nonetheless make some of the following assertions.

While the works of the robber barons was often condemned in the press, the United States commitment to industrialization and free markets (compared to other countries) was extremely high in the late 19th and early 20th century. Unlike many countries after World War I, the 1920s saw great economic expansion for upper-income individuals as well as a growth in median income. However, labor unrest continued to mount throughout the 1920s and 1930s as the lack of wage and hour rules, child labor protections, unemployment insurance, the right to organize, workplace safety requirements and social security insurance continued to exacerbate the discontents of the substantial numbers of working poor.

The Great Depression caused massive unemployment and with it massive public distrust of corporations and wealthy individuals. In response, the New Deal instituted by Franklin D. Roosevelt went into effect with massive public support. Many lawyers and economists influenced by Keynes worked under the New Deal and believed that free markets would lead to disaster without proper regulation.

While the American economy boomed for about 30 years following World War II with the benefit of Keynesianism, robust anti-trust regulation to promote competition and financial regulations to prevent the most volatile forms of market speculation, high unionization rates and protections promoting the growth of domestic industry, during the 1970s stagflation (brought on by the 1973 oil crisis and the shift from the gold standard to fiat currency) was made to discredit the policy consensus set in place under the years of the New Deal Coalition. This culminated in the election of Reagan in 1980 and many of the statutes and organizations created by the New Deal were dismantled.

London was the center of the so-called First Era of Globalization due to the power and resources of the British Empire. However, World War I severely weakened Britain, causing massive unemployment. While the United Kingdom successfully held out during World War II and emerged victorious, the war effectively caused the dismantling of its empire.

Winston Churchill was influenced by the work of Hayek and opposed heavy government interference in the British economy. However, during the 1945 elections the Labour Party led by Clement Attlee came to power in force and was dedicated to government controls to prevent another economic crisis. The United Kingdom's major industries were nationalized and practically all occupations and the wages they earned were heavily regulated and unionized.

This practice became so prevalent that even Conservative governments later elected into power did nothing to change it. However, during the 1970s massive strikes by unions (see the Three-Day Week and Winter of Discontent) combined with other economic woes such as the 1973 oil crisis almost ground the British economy to a halt. Thatcher, an ardent admirer of Hayek, began. While her results were initially mixed, the Falklands War brought on a nationalistic fervor that kept Thatcher in office long enough to keep her reforms in place. Although the Labour Party later came back to power, it did not attempt to challenge the key principles of Thatcherism.

Within a few years of the rise of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet economy went into a major crisis. Lenin responded with the New Economic Policy, a program that allowed limited capitalistic activity (resulting in what he himself would call state capitalism) and the economy began to improve. Lenin's commanding heights speech was his attempt to defend himself against accusations that he sold out the principles of the revolution by implementing this new policy.

Under Joseph Stalin, the Soviet agricultural and heavy manufacturing sectors were largely centralized. During the 1940s–1970s, the Soviet economy grew at a rate that outpaced that of Western European nations.

By the 1980s, the Soviet economy was in shambles. Because of a lack of incentives and ironically a more tolerant central government, workers did not put much effort into their duties. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union continued to build the military even though at times such spending took up half the country's revenue. Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform the economy, but he took only limited steps (see perestroika and glasnost). When he lifted the Brezhnev Doctrine and allowed Poland's Solidarity to usurp that country's communist regime, the entire Warsaw Pact collapsed, soon followed by the Soviet Union itself.

However, even with the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the relatively free market-minded Boris Yeltsin, former members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union maintained much power in Russia, blocked free market movements and forced the resignation of Yeltsin's free-market allies such as Yegor Gaidar. During the 1996 elections, Yeltsin was forced to accept support from the oligarchs to counter the growing power of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. While Yeltsin remained in power, the privatization of industries proceeded in an extremely unequal manner.

As predicted by Keynes, the hyperinflation caused by the Treaty of Versailles devastated the German economy and created political instability. In addition to widespread unemployment, this hyperinflation effectively wiped out the country's middle class and this environment made it easy for the Nazi Party to gain power. They also argue that the Nazis practiced central planning despite the fact that after taking power industries were privatized en masse.

Following the war and break-up of Germany, East Germany came under the rule of the Soviets while West Germany remained part of the Western powers. When economic conditions in occupied West Germany failed to improve, without consulting the occupying powers Ludwig Erhard completely destroyed price controls in 1948. After this, the Western German economy underwent a massive recovery, although such free market reforms remains largely confined to the country for many years.

By the time of German reunification in 1989, West Germany was an economic power while East Germany faced many problems due the collapse of the central planning authority.

Unlike Mahatma Gandhi, who supported a village centric economy, after India's independence in 1947 its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promoted industrialization. However, he supported government-controlled development and the bureaucracy that developed stifled innovation (the authors of "The Commanding Heights" sarcastically claim that the British Raj was replaced by a permit Raj). Bribery and delays became commonplace in the Indian economy while at the same time many prominent economists studied the country and attempted to fine tune its central planning.

By the 1990s, the Indian government began to relax these stringent regulations mainly due to the influence of Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Indian economy bloomed under the effects of exports and outsourcing and political parties since this period have continued to promote these changes. The free marketer Singh was appointed Prime Minister when his party won the elections in 2004, even though he was not the victorious United Progressive Alliance's stated candidate and the general expectation was Sonia Gandhi would take the seat.

Under the influence of dependency theory, a Marxist approach to international economics, many Latin American countries attempted to industrialize by limiting imports of manufactured goods and subsidizing their own industries. However, in the absence of competition and with government subsidies these companies had little incentive to become efficient or innovative. By the 1980s, the economic problems of these countries became obvious and much of the West's investment in these countries was lost.

Chile unwittingly became an experiment in free markets when Augusto Pinochet called in followers of Friedman to evaluate the economy, the so-called Chicago boys. The authors argue that these economic reforms proved successful, but since Pinochet was a dictator who came to power in a coup and had many political opponents murdered the whole idea of free market reform became linked to fascism. While the authors and Friedman claim that these reforms eventually promoted democracy, they acknowledge that this issue and their interpretation of events is extremely controversial.

The authors argue that Africa's economic development was severely hindered by central planning, socialist ideas and political dictatorships that promoted warfare and other conflicts.

While Japan was seen for many years as an economic success story as late as the early 1990s, the authors argue that its ongoing recession since then resulted from its governments refusal to stop subsidies to many of its industries and companies (this issue is ongoing).

Poland's free market reforms pushed by Solidarity and Lech Wałęsa were initially mixed and criticized by its citizens, but by the late 1990s the Polish economy was doing much better than other former communist states in the Eastern Bloc. One feature of the Polish economy that makes it different from other capitalistic countries is that it is dominated by small businesses rather than corporations or conglomerates.

China is another major ongoing issue. While Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao Zedong gradually introduced free market, he did not promote civil liberties or other freedoms as demonstrated by his willingness to crush pro-democracy demonstrators. While the authors hope according to Friedman's ideas that free markets will eventually promote a free society, it has not happened yet although China's economy continues to grow.

In 2002, PBS aired a six-hour documentary based on the book. This documentary was later sold on DVD and is available for viewing free at PBS' web site. The documentary is narrated by David Ogden Stiers.

Thanks to its later date, the documentary film is able to address many of the items Yergin and Stanislaw missed in their original book, including the Great Recession, the collapse of Asian economies, the anti-globalization movement and the September 11 attacks. All told, two of the documentary's six hours—the entire final third—address things that happened since the original book was published. They also include free market solutions to international poverty that was not included in the book and they interview economist Hernando de Soto, whose book on the subject was not published until after the initial printing of "The Commanding Heights".

Like the book, the documentary attracted more support and criticism. One example is the anti-globalization movement, which argued they were portrayed unfairly. In the documentary, James Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, is interviewed and says that such protesters are attacking people "who are devoting their lives to addressing the very questions that these people claim to be addressing". The documentary includes a scene of Wolfensohn getting hit in the face with a pie by a protester.

Unlike the book, the PBS documentary is far more wary of the possible end of the current era of globalization. For example, they include a parallel between radio stocks of the 1920s and dot com stocks of the 1990s—both were industries built on new technology which had little capital, but which fell prey to a market bubble. Likewise, the documentary draws an unsettling parallel between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the terrorist assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914.

The documentary is also accused of further oversimplfying the so-called battle of ideas between Keynes and Hayek. For example, in the DVD version Keynes is named together with Karl Marx and Lenin as supporters of controlled economies. However, Keynes saw himself as a liberal in both the party political and economic senses of the term.

The production was financed by donations from Electronic Data Systems, FedEx, BP, The Pew Charitable Trusts, John Templeton Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

President Evo Morales, of poor but natural gas-rich Bolivia, joined the TCP on 29 April 2006, only days before he announced his intention to nationalize Bolivia's hydrocarbon assets. Bolivia is a member of both UNASUR and ALBA, thus its attitude is crucial to relations between the two, says Marion Hörmann, since Bolivia is traditionally seen as a mediator between the Andean countries and the rest of South America..
Venezuela and Ecuador are also members of UNASUR.

Member states of ALBA

Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) has 10 member states and three observer states. In addition, Suriname is a "special guest member" which intends to become a full member.

When it was launched, ALBA had two member states, Venezuela and Cuba. Subsequently a number of other Latin American and Caribbean nations have entered into this Peoples' Trade Agreement (Spanish: "Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos", or TCP) which aims to implement the principles of ALBA.

Newly elected President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua signed the agreement in January 2007; Venezuela agreed to forgive Nicaragua's US$31 million debt as a result. On 23 February 2007, Ortega visited Caracas to solidify Nicaragua's participation in ALBA. However, Nicaragua is also a member of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).

Rafael Correa, the president of Ecuador, signed a joint agreement with Hugo Chávez, for Ecuador to become a member of ALBA once he became president. Ecuador officially joined in June 2009.

In January 2008, the Caribbean island nation of Dominica joined ALBA.

In April 2009, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was accepted as the seventh member of ALBA, while Grenada stated publicly that it was not yet ready to join the bloc.

In June 2009, the Prime Minister of Jamaica said he would seek to address the future of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) given the effects of ALBA and Trinidad and Tobago's proposed political union with the OECS on the Caribbean Community as the two main elements he says will have a "destabilising effect" on the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) bloc.

Antigua and Barbuda, Ecuador and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines formally joined ALBA on 24 June 2009.

On 25 August 2008, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya signed an agreement to join the ALBA, with a rally in front of the Presidential House that was attended by many of the presidents of the countries that are part of ALBA, including Chávez and Morales. The Honduran congressled by Roberto Micheletti, who later became Zelaya's main political enemy, and president of the interim government after the 2009 Honduran coup d'étatapproved ALBA on 9 October 2008. On 16 December 2009, the Honduran congress met to withdraw the country from the ALBA, claiming a "lack of respect" from Venezuela since the country's joining in 2008, citing in particular Hugo Chavez' remarks about a potential invasion of Honduras to restore Manuel Zelaya to office, after he was removed on 28 June 2009 in the 2009 Honduran coup d'état. Withdrawal from ALBA was ratified by the Honduran Congress on 13 January 2010. Economic relations with Venezuela continue, including via Petrocaribe.

Saint Lucia joined as a full member on 30 July 2013. Grenada and Saint Kitts and Nevis became members on 14 December 2014. With their accession, all independent countries in the Lesser Antilles except Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are now members.

Ecuador announced its withdrawal from ALBA on 23 August 2018.

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in South America, with 45% of its population living below the poverty line. Poverty is a major cause of child labor in Bolivia, and children from poor families work in order to support the well-being of their families and to supply their basic needs of survival. Low living standards combined with low educational attainment increases poverty rates and the prevalence of child labor. UNICEF reports that a family’s access to financial credit influences the likelihood of children working, as greater access to financial credit reduces the chances of children working, and of children working in more dangerous occupations.

Child labor in Bolivia

Child labor in Bolivia is a widespread phenomenon. A 2014 document on the worst forms of child labor released by the U.S. Department of Labor estimated that approximately 20.2% of children between the ages of 7 and 14, or 388,541 children make up the labor force in Bolivia. Indigenous children are more likely to be engaged in labor than children who reside in urban areas. The activities of child laborers are diverse, however the majority of child laborers are involved in agricultural labor, and this activity varies between urban and rural areas. Bolivia has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990. Bolivia has also ratified the International Labour Organization’s Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (138) and the ILO’s worst forms of child labor convention (182). In July 2014, the Bolivian government passed the new child and adolescent code, which lowered the minimum working age to ten years old given certain working conditions The new code stipulates that children between the ages of ten and twelve can legally work given they are self-employed while children between 12 and 14 may work as contracted laborers as long as their work does not interfere with their education and they work under parental supervision.

The International Labour Organization defines child labor as work that “deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity and that is harmful to their mental and physical development.”

UNICEF defines children as engaging in child labor as those between the ages of 5 and 11 who participate in one hour of economic activity or 28 hours of domestic activity a week, and those between 12 and 14 who participate in at least 14 hours of economic activity or 28 hours of domestic work a week.

A large percentage of child laborers, about 70.9% are employed in the agricultural sector, working in activities such as planting and harvesting corn, working on cattle ranches, and planting and harvesting chestnuts and sugarcane. In rural areas children begin working at a young age, and participate in activities on small-scale farms and on medium and large plantations doing activities such as sowing, harvesting, weeding and taking care of cattle. Children who work in subsistence agriculture are exposed to harmful chemicals and are obligated to work for long hours, which reduces their ability to receive an education Work on plantations is more difficult than work on small-scale farms, and children are exposed to more pesticides and hazardous working conditions which may result in infections and physical injuries from use of farm equipment. Mining in Bolivia is a common activity carried out by child laborers in rural areas, and the ILO has estimated that around 13,500 children are involved in mining. Work in mines is divided along age and gender lines, with girls and younger children involved in less dangerous work such as washing clothes and searching for minerals outside of mining sites while only boys work in actual mines in more dangerous work involving use of explosives and the grinding of minerals In urban areas, children are involved in agriculture but are mainly involved in jobs in industry and service which include domestic labor, woodwork, vending and prostitution. Work in urban areas is divided along gender lines with girls mostly carrying out jobs in markets or in domestic labor while boys do more physically strenuous labor in construction sites or working in garages, and children who work in domestic labor and on the streets are more susceptible to physical, verbal and sexual abuse as there is little protection for these children. Children involved in the worst forms of child labor such as mining, child prostitution and strenuous plantation work live in deplorable living conditions and have limited access to sanitary water, and good healthcare.

Lack of access to an education is a major cause and consequence of child labor. A study carried out by Jiménez and Vera concerning disparities in educational attainment in Bolivia found that a gap exists between urban and rural areas, with children in urban areas having a higher rate of primary education completion and access to an education. The ILO reports that the percentage of children who are not enrolled in school is 2.5%, with a higher percentage of rural children being out of school. A study carried out by Zapata, Contreras and Kruger (2011) found that gender and ethnicity plays a role in the relationship between child labor and educational attainment in Bolivia. They found that girls are 51% more likely to not be enrolled in school and to be working, mostly in domestic occupations, and indigenous children are 60% more likely to not be enrolled in school and to be working. Access to high quality education can be very limited, as is the number of secondary schools available to students especially in rural areas. The educational attainment of parents influences the likelihood of children working, and the higher the level of educational attainment of parents, the lesser the likelihood of children participating in economic activities. Parents with lower educational attainment were likely child laborers themselves and value working more highly than receiving an education. The high cost of education for poor families results in the decision to have their children participate in the labor force

The causes of child labor are not only to economic depravity but also to cultural reasons. In Andean culture, work is seen as an important agent of socialization for children as it is an integral part of their inclusion into the wider community, and it enables them to learn traditional societal values. Work is important to the social organization of indigenous communities, where children work in order to contribute to the cohesiveness of family units and while the whole community works together to protect children The cultural cause of child labor is related to definitions of children and childhood. Western concepts of childhood define children as vulnerable and helpless and lead to attempts to abolish child labor in order to protect children. According to Hanson and Vandaele (2003), child laborers disagree with the Western perspective of childhood and claim their right to work in dignity as social agents in society

In the UNICEF Bolivia country program (2013-2017), they have pledged to increase technical support to management and monitoring systems social services that protect children from abuse and sexual exploitation. The program seeks to improve overall children’s overall access to social services and to protest children’s rights.

The ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) works in Bolivia to combat child labor through promotion of equitable access to education through research and statistics on the impact of child labor on educational attainment and monitoring of the worst forms of child labor.

The Bolivian Ministry of Education has undertaken initiatives to improve the educational attainment of child laborers including an "accelerated leveling program" for child laborers who are behind in school.

Though resource rich, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. In the 1980s the tin market collapsed, the currency dived, and inflation soared. Austerity measures restored some confidence, but at the cost of widening inequality. This was exacerbated when, at the behest of the US, coca growing, a prime source of income for the poor, was shut down. There are also tensions over natural gas deposits, perhaps Bolivia's last remaining resource. And while GDP and GNI have both grown significantly since 2000, severe disparities exist both regionally and ethnically. UNICEF reports that women and children are the most vulnerable group. In 2002, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line was 82% in rural areas and 54% in urban areas.The departments with the most poverty are Potosi, Chuquisaca and Pando, while Santa Cruz and Tarija have the least.

Inequality in Bolivia

Gini coefficient data indicates that income inequality in Bolivia has increased from 1990 to 2014 (from 42 to 48.4).

Bolivia is one of the most culturally diverse societies in Latin America, with approximately 35 different ethnic groups. Official figures from the Bolivian
Population Census 2001 estimates that approximately 62% of the total population are indigenous in 2001.

However, this majority of the population remain highly marginalized in economic terms and continue to live in extreme poverty. In Bolivia, mean income per capita in indigenous households was about 300 Bolivian Bolivianos per month in 2001 compared with 480 Bolivian Bolivianos for non-indigenous households. This gap can partly be explained by the fact that the largest source of income among the non-indigenous is non-agricultural wages, while the most important source of income for indigenous families, is agricultural self-employment which tend to be lower on average. By factoring out the difference in income due to types of employment, indigenous families still receive lower average incomes compared to non-indigenous families even within each category of employment. It should also be noted that the differences in income might also be due to differences in worker characteristics. However, neither labour market experience nor female participation seems to drive the differences in incomes. Education has appeared to have the biggest correlation with the disparity in income.

The main social indicators by the (such as illiteracy rate, mother and child mortality; primary and secondary enrolment rates) also indicate that indigenous peoples have significantly less access to social services than non-indigenous peoples. While non-indigenous people (age 15 and older) completed on average 9.6 years of education, indigenous peoples only completed 5.9 years.

In spite of the significant progress Bolivia has made in enhancing access to education in terms of overall school enrolment rates in the last decade, a high drop-out rate, especially among indigenous children is responsible for a persistent education gap between the indigenous and non-indigenous, with 42.4% of indigenous students dropping out before completing primary school compared to only 17.6% of non-indigenous students.

Ever since Bolivia was freed from Spanish rule in 1825, the country has experienced considerable instability. The government has been overthrown over 200 times and the constitution rewritten. Widespread poverty has been a major factor in the country's poor development and poor governance.

Corruption in Bolivia

Corruption in Bolivia is a major problem that has been called an accepted part of life in the country. It can be found at all levels of Bolivian society. Citizens of the country perceive the judiciary, police and public administration generally as the country's most corrupt. Corruption is also widespread among officials who are supposed to control the illegal drug trade and among those working in and with extractive industries.

Many Bolivians are uneducated and thus unaware of their rights as citizens or of laws against corruption.

In the latter half of the 20th century, the government was passed back and forth between civilian and military control repeatedly, some of them notorious for corruption. In 1980-81, when Luis García Meza Tejada was dictator, several thousand civil servants were prosecuted for embezzlement; in 1986, García Meza was charged with treason, sedition, and many other crimes, along with 55 of his associates; he fled the country in 1989.

Victor Paz Estenssoro’s government (1985-89) introduced a degree of stability and democracy. Under Gonzalo “Goni” Sanchez de Lozada, president from 1993 to 1997 and from 2002 to 2003, however, witness the selling off state industries in a process that was widely viewed as corrupt, with many of the purchasers being firms with whom he had close ties.

Evo Morales, elected Bolivia's president in December 2005, convinced poor and middle-class voters that his promised social revolution would overcome establishment corruption. Increased revenues from the exploitation of Bolivia's rich natural resources helped improve macro-economic performance during the decade between 2002 and 2012. Transparency has also improved under Morales. Nonetheless, Bolivia remains the poorest nation in South America, with real GDP lower than it was a generation ago and most of the population still living below the poverty line.

Transparency International's 2016 Corruption Perception Index ranks the country 113th place out of 176 countries

Similarly, the World Bank gave Bolivia a score of 38.9 for corruption on the Worldwide Governance Indicators scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), a decline from 2007 (43.7) but an improvement over 2009 (29.2). From 2007 to 2011, 80% of citizens thought corruption had worsened or stayed constant. A 2010 report suggested that citizens’ perception of the level of public-sector corruption was worse than the actual scale of such corruption. Business executives, by contrast, saw the situation as having improved since 2009.

Inhabitants of Bolivia tend to consider the state “hopelessly corrupt,” yet under Morales, paradoxically, have allowed it to control an ever-greater portion of the economy, greatly expanding opportunities for corruption. A 2015 report found that while Bolivians do not consider Morales personally corrupt, and re-elected him handily in October 2014, they do think there is more corruption than ever and that it is the fault of the government.

There is a degree of tolerance toward government corruption in Bolivia, a belief that it is acceptable given the “good things” the government does for the people. Many Bolivians subscribe to the traditional belief that only a fool does not take advantage of every opportunity to enrich himself, whether illicitly or not; others believe that with the ascent of Morales, who is an indigenous person, it is now the turn of that group to reap the benefits of corruption as other groups have done before. Indeed, a belief in the importance of group identify, and consequently a tendency to embrace the attitudes of the collective, often trumps individual ethics in Bolivian society.

Government bureaucracy is seen as inefficient, bloated, and full of clientelism, and is considered (along with the police) one of the most corrupt sectors in the country. Hiring and promotion are politically driven and lacking in transparency.

Government officials tend to treat public financial data as their own property and tend not to grasp their obligation to provide information to the public. In 2010, Bolivia scored 13 out of 100 on the Open Budget Index, the worst performance for any Latin American country, but an improvement on its 2008 score of 7.

Some reports suggest that rampant corruption within the government and elite perpetuate poverty and make it impossible for advancement. The Bertelsmann Foundation stated in 2012 that despite laws and safeguards, local government partakes in illicit enrichment schemes.

In 2011, Flores Roberts, governor of Pando, was accused of establishing front companies. A former employee who reported him to the police, Claudia Silvana Salas, was later arrested and imprisoned on extortion charges and was receiving “anonymous threats.”

In September 2015, Bolivia’s rural development minister, Nemesia Achocollo, and its ambassador to Paraguay, Rosendo Alpiri, resigned after being implicated in a major scandal involving a foundation called the Indigenous Fund. A report showed that between 2010 and 2011, only 20% of 153 of the fund's approved projects were actually implemented and almost US$10 million was unaccounted for. Others implicated were indigenous leader Marco Antonio Aramayo and Felipa Huanca, a leader of the Bartolina Sisa Campesina Women’s Federation. Over 200 individuals, including government officials and friends and members of Morales's MAS party, ended up being accused of corruption in connection with the fund's disbursements. It was noted that the first person to draw attention to corruption at the fund, back in 2012, was Jacobo Soruco Cholima, head of a Rural Workers’ Union, who was murdered in June of that year, apparently in retaliation for his whistleblowing.

In February 2016, Morales was accused of influence-peddling involving a Chinese construction firm, CAMC, for which his ex-girlfriend, Gabriela Zapata, worked and which received lucrative government contracts. Journalist Carlos Valverde, who made the relationship public, charged that Morales had used his position to help advance Zapata’s career. Valverde noted that the value of Bolivia's contracts with the firm rose from $214 million to over half a billion dollars after the firm hired Zapata. Zapata was arrested in late February.

Also in February 2016, six people died when protesters set fire to the municipal offices in the indigenous city of El Alto. The fire was blamed on former officials who allegedly sought to destroy documents relating to a probe into their own corrupt activities.

Although the constitution guarantees the right to private property, this right is often infringed, with expropriation occurring frequently.

Bolivia's customs service is highly corrupt and inefficient, with more than one in three respondents in a survey saying that they had paid a bribe to customs officers during the previous year.

The complexity of Bolivian tax law provides opportunities for corruption.

A 2009 report stated that improved inspection control, involving the use of a so-called “process flow approach,” has helped reduce corruption in the tax service and reduced loss of public funds.

Elections themselves are generally considered free and fair, although campaign financing safeguards are highly inadequate. In 2009 elections, EU observers reported widespread abuse of the public budget by incumbents, with campaigns being partly financed by civil servants' salaries. A 2010 report found Bolivia the weakest of all Latin American countries in this regard and noted the lack of limits on political donations and the absence of any law requiring disclosure thereof.

Bribery is a crime in Bolivia, but a 2011 survey found that one of every three Bolivians had to pay a bribe in that year. The worst offenders were the judiciary, police and customs service.

Officials charged with corruption are very often given immunity from prosecution in violation of the constitutional. Congress must approve in advance of any legal action against the executive. In 2014, Ever Moya, the former president of the Human Rights Committee, resigned after several corruption complaints he had submitted met with official indifference.

The judiciary is viewed as Bolivia's most corrupt sector. It is weak, inefficient, short on resources, and subject to interference by politicians, with court decisions often being influenced by bribery. Its independence was challenged in 2010 when Morales appointed five judges to the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Judicial Council. Prosecutors are not independent, and they have often targeted opposition-party politicians and their supporters. Also, the 2009 Constitution placed indigenous courts on a par with the mainstream judicial system, which causes conflicts, confusion, difficulties, and delays. In 2015 Morales “called for a referendum designed to root out corruption in the judicial system.”

In 2014, the Senate called on the attorney general to suspend 300 of Bolivia's 508 public prosecutors for corruption and other offenses. Between January and August 2014, 45 prosecutors were disbarred, twice the number disbarred in 2013.

Police corruption is a major problem, owing partly to low wage and poor training. The police are generally viewed as the nation's third most corrupt institution, and corruption is widely seen as the main impediment to legitimate crime-fighting. In six years, three police chiefs have been fired for corruption or abuse of power. Many police officers have ties to organized crime, mainly drug traffickers, and many are appointed to senior positions, a power that is exclusively exercised by the president, because of their political connections.

The narcotics police and secret police have been involved in cocaine trafficking since the late 1950s, with cocaine producers and traffickers being treated as respectable businessmen and coexisting peacefully with one government after another. Large-scale drug-related corruption in Bolivia's military and police force dates back to the 1970s and intensified in 1980-81, when dictator Luis García Meza Tejada's “inner cabinet” was packed with persons involved in cocaine trafficking, notably Colonel Ariel Coca and Colonel Luis Arce Gómez. In 1988, Bolivia's foreign minister charged that narcotics traffickers were trying to influence policy, and a secret videotape of politicians and military officers socializing with a drug kingpin, Roberto Suárez Gómez, was shown on television. In the same year it was reported that police and prosecutors were returning large drug finds to narcotics traffickers and turning only small caches over to the authorities. President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989–93) was friendly with two “drug barons,” Carmelo “Meco” Domínguez and Isaac “Oso” Chavarría. Over the decades there have been repeated scandals concerning official involvement in trafficking, and they have resulted in many firings but not very many prosecutions; also, those removed from their positions because of such involvement have tended to be lower-level people, while guilty higher-ups have generally been left alone to continue operating.

Bolivia has become a regional drug-trafficking hub through which narcotics are funneled to Argentina and Brazil. One reason for this is the corruption and incompetence of the police. Many police officers are directly involved in trafficking, while others accept payoffs to facilitate shipments. In 2011, Rene Sanabria, then head of a police intelligence center, and former national police commissioner pled guilty to U.S. cocaine trafficking charges.

In 2011, the reputation of the police was damaged by a probe of forty officers suspected of ties to drug trafficking. Also, the former anti-drug czar, René Sanabria, was arrested in Panama and tried in the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges.

In January 2015, 20 prosecutors, 18 judges, and 12 police officials who had handled corruption and drug- trafficking cases were investigated for irregularities in their declarations of assets. One police colonel, for example, had accumulated nearly $145,000 over ten years on a salary of about $400 a month, and had reported the purchase of five properties while omitting the purchase of two additional properties.

In May 2015, the problem of police corruption in Bolivia was highlighted by the case of Martín Belaunde Lossio, a Peruvian politician and businessman, whose escape from house arrest in Bolivia was believed to be made possible by paid-off police officers. “Some groups within our institutions, such as the police,” commented Morales, “are creating a bad image of Bolivia.”

The national police's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigates cases of police corruption and may sanction officers for minor infractions. Major violations are prosecuted by the Attorney General. An observer has stated that Bolivia's police force needs a “complete overhaul” in order to combat drug trafficking and other international crime. One study suggested that government intervention allowed for corruption, and therefore taking a less hands-on approach would decrease corruption significantly.

Companies consider corruption a major obstacle for business in the country. About a fifth of them expect to pay bribes to civil servants to do business. Bureaucratic procedures are complex and burdensome, and often involve illegal “facilitation payments.” Several sectors, notably public procurement and natural-resources extraction, are characterized by extensive patronage networks and clientelism. The risk of corruption is especially high when business must deal with the justice system, where bribes often must be paid in exchange for favorable decisions. One example of favoritism was the courts' refusal to take a 2015 case involving a catering company owned by a sister-in-law of the vice-president.

Companies are also likely to encounter corruption when dealing with the public services sector, in which bribes are often required in exchange for licenses and permits. The same is true of the land administration sector, because property rights are not often protected in practice and expropriation is common, with compensation amounts being determined by negotiations rather than through consistent and transparent processes. Corruption in the tax bureau and customs sectors also impact companies doing business in Bolivia; in the latter sector, corruption occurs more often importing goods, rather than when exporting goods.

The product procurement sector is especially corrupt, with bribes being exchanged for government contracts and public funds often being diverted to favored companies and individuals.

Bolivia is rich in natural resources, a sector that is highly prone to corruption worldwide. The country is very dependent on extractives, with revenues making up almost a fifth of the national budget. The 2009 Constitution nationalized all hydrocarbon resources; oil and gas production is now under the purview of the government firm YPFB. The fact that the government controls both operation and regulation in this sector is widely seen as increasing opportunities for corruption. Scandals involving nepotism, kickbacks, and other forms of corruption have plagued the YPFB for years and led to the firing and imprisonment of several individuals.

Corruption played a key role in the nationalization process, with leaders of YPFB being sent to prison in 2011 for bribery and influence-peddling. These events intensified the widespread sense that the government's claim to be fighting corruption is insincere.

In 2009, an executive of a Bolivian-Argentine hydrocarbon firm, Cartler Uniservice, was shot in La Paz while allegedly delivering a large kickback to the family of the then president of YPFB, Santos Ramirez, and a close friend of Morales's. Ramirez was fired and given a 12-year prison sentence. In 2012, in a case called “Santos Ramitez II,” two other YPFB officials were charged with bribery, abuse of public resources, and illicit enrichment. In 2014 four top officials at YPFB were arrested for corruption, and two more for influence peddling.

Local communities officially control their own natural resources, but are not protected from federal intervention, and are susceptible to corruption by government agencies or corporations. Citizens' constitutional right of access to financial information about extractive industries is not always respected.

As noted, police and customs authorities often collude with organized criminals, although other sectors are also affected by this sort of activity.

Laws against money laundering are considered insufficient and ineffective.

Bolivia ranks 108th of 179 countries for press freedom. Although freedom of expression and of the media are technically permitted, the government controls the allocation of licenses for print and broadcasting media. However, it is said that the state does not censor internet media.

Media firms are not mandated to disclose ownership information, which makes possible conflicts of interest and erodes transparency.

Morales has placed legal, political, and economic pressure on opposition media, and such pressure has led to journalistic self-censorship. The government did not investigate the 2012 murder of two journalists. The media are considered “partly free.” A law forbidding expression of “racism” in the media is considered an attempt by the ruling regime to silence opposition criticism of pro-indigent government actions.

The Law against Corruption, Illicit Enrichment, and the Investigation of Assets criminalizes most forms of corruption. The Anti-Corruption Law of 2010 which applies to all public officials and has no statute of limitations, does not specifically address narcotics-related corruption, but was used in 2011 to bring narcotics charges and to indict judges for dismissing narcotics charges. A law adopted in 2004 requires all executive-branch institutions to make their budget information public and respond in a timely way to information requests. There are several more laws in place to prevent corruption in its various forms. None of these laws, however, is adequately enforced.

Transparency International stated in 2012 that Bolivia has made “significant efforts” to improve transparency, and noted Morales's declaration of “zero tolerance” of corruption, but acknowledged that anti-corruption laws continue to be poorly enforced and that corruption therefore remains a serious problem.

The Ministry of Anticorruption and Transparency, founded in 2009, is tasked with promoting anti-corruption policies and investigating corruption cases at every level in every government branch. In March 2010, Congress passed a law that gives the state broad authority to prove private and public corruption. An April 2011 law seeks to reduce corruption in the police force. The National Council Against Corruption is charged with monitoring the National Plan against Corruption's progress.

In 2005, Bolivia ratified the UN's 2003 anti-corruption convention, although it neglected to join an initiative to inhibit the bribing of public officials. Bolivia is also part of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption, with an ombudsman appointed to protect human rights and guard against government abuse.

Bolivia is not a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, but is a signatory of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Red Participación y Justicia is an anti-corruption coalition that is made up of more than one hundred organizations.

Several CSOs address transparency and corruption. A 2016 OAS report called for greater anti-corruption efforts in Bolivia and praised certain best practices, such as the “Mi Plataforma” initiative at the Ministry for Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption and the Executive Branch Ministries Master Salary Scale instituted by the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. The UNODC's Bolivia Country Programme 2010-2015 includes an anti-corruption component. Along with other ministries, the UNODC developed seven educational games to raise awareness about corruption which have been used in schools, parks, and fairs to encourage civic involvement in fighting corruption.

A September 2015 article in Foreign Policy described how La Paz “freed itself from a ubiquitous culture of corruption.” This took place thanks to Juan Del Granado, elected mayor in 1999 on a platform of “transformation.” When he ordered fuel for municipal vehicles and the supplier handed him a check for $1,000, the usual kickback, he expelled the man from city hall. He set in place a zero-tolerance policy on graft. Former mayors, including Gaby Candia, Lupe Andrade, and Germán Monroy Chazarreta, were prosecuted and jailed. In 2004, Del Granado established a Transparency Unit, which provided a special telephone tip line, email address, and online complaints procedure for reporting corruption, and whose staffers posed as public-service users to ferret out officials who demanded irregular fees and bribes. Del Granado also instituted rewards for good practice, giving out awards to “efficient, transparent, cordial, and honest” city employees. In addition, he vigorously enforced the 1990 Financial Administration System and Governmental Control Act (SAFCO) and encouraged citizen participation in neighborhood governance.

Bolivia was chosen as a programme country for Denmark in 1994, because Bolivia were the poorest country in South America. Denmark started assisting Bolivia with diaries. Because of the political situation in Bolivia, Denmark suspended the assistance in 1980. In 1993 the cooperation resumed.
Danish development assistance to Bolivia focuses on democracy, human rights, agriculture, education and environment.
In 2005, DANIDA cut the aid from 200 million to 150 million because of the social problems in Bolivia. In 2010, after 13 years of cooperation, the assistance for indigenous people ended.

Bolivia–Denmark relations

Bolivia–Denmark relations refers to the current and historical relations between Bolivia and Denmark. Bolivia has an embassy in Copenhagen, and Denmark has an embassy in La Paz.

Diplomatic relations were established on 28 February 1930. On 9 November 1931, a commercial treaty was signed, to further develop commercial relations between Bolivia and Denmark. In 1974, an agreement on a Danish loan to Bolivia was signed. In 1977, another agreement on a loan to Bolivia was signed. In August 2000, Bolivia and Denmark signed a Mining–Environment accord, an agreement to reduce the environmental and social effects in some Bolivian towns. Denmark is assisting Bolivia with $1.54 million for the agreement.

In 2006, when the Bolivian President Evo Morales ordered the Bolivian gas resources to be nationalized, the Danish Development Minister Ulla Tørnæs threatened to stop the assistance, because it is not compatible with the Danish development assistance.
In December 2009, Bolivian President Evo Morales visited Denmark for the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference. After the conference, Bolivia accused the United States and Denmark for cutting the aid to Bolivia because of their opposition to the Copenhagen Accord. In 2009, when Morales tried to lift a ban on coca in the United Nations treaty Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Denmark with some other countries opposed the idea.

In 2008, Danish exports to Bolivia amounted 51 million DKK, and Bolivian exports amounted 6 million DKK.

Poverty in South America is high in most countries. All of the countries in South America are greatly affected by poverty to some extent. From 1999 to 2010, poverty dropped from 43.8% to 31.8%. The countries that have the highest rates are Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela. All of these countries are trying to reduce poverty, with varying degrees of effort and success.
However, in recent years most South American countries have experienced great economic decline. Thanks to this improvement in the economy, action is being taken by most South American countries to reduce poverty and improve the life quality of the people.
New infrastructure is being built and more housing is being provided. Education is also a major concern, and the governments are spending millions of dollars in funding schools.

Poverty in South America

There are many different reasons why a greater proportion of a country's population may be in poverty than in others, and there are a variety of factors that may explain poverty in South America. Each country has their own internal problems, which leads to their high percentage of poverty, and an overview of poverty in each of these countries in South America (except Chile) follows in the section below.

The relatively low poverty rate is shared with the country's neighbors to the west and east, Chile and Uruguay; but contrasts with most of Argentina's northern neighbors (Bolivia and Paraguay), and has resulted in a wave of immigration from these latter to Argentina since the 1960s, mainly to Buenos Aires and its environs.
Poverty rates, measured by Argentine parameters, are higher than those reported by the UN, however. "Structural poverty", based on substandard housing, affected 17.7% of the population at the 2001 Census. Income poverty is also higher, and unlike structural poverty (which has gradually declined over the decades), has varied sharply between Argentina's economic cycles. This proportion rose sharply, for instance, during the 1989 currency crisis (from 26% to 47%), while the early success of the Convertibility Plan cut the rate to 16% by 1994; income poverty rose again in the ensuing years, to 35% by 2001, and reached 54% during the depths of the crisis in 2002.

The incidence of income poverty declined markedly during the subsequent economic recovery, and by the end of 2009 reached 9.0% of households and 13.2% of the population. Income poverty, in the first half of 2010, officially included adults living with a monthly disposable income of around 370 Argentine pesos (US$95) per person, and children for whom monthly expenditures are no more than around 200 pesos (US$51) each; a family of two adults and two children were considered poor in early 2010 if their monthly family expenditures were less than around 1,140 pesos (US$292).

Critics of the official INDEC survey charge that both the inflation rate used to measure poverty and the official baseline household budgets themselves are understated, however. The official income poverty line increased 150% between 2001 and early 2010; but most private surveys of household conditions in Argentina estimate it at half again as much as the official threshold, and the effective poverty rate at around 25% of the population. Absolute poverty estimates, as measured by the inability to meet a minimum nutritional budget, also differ: this condition includes 3.5% of the population officially, and around 10% per private estimates.

Poverty in Argentina varies widely according to region, and provinces in the north have historically shouldered the nation's highest poverty rates. Estimates of income poverty in this region ranged from around 20% officially, to over 40% in private estimates; substandard living conditions affected around 30% of this region's population in the 2001 Census. The city of Buenos Aires proper, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego Provinces typically benefit from the nation's lowest poverty rates (around 7 to 14%, depending on the measurement). Buenos Aires, in particular, has been increasingly blighted by shantytowns, however, as it continues to be a magnet for the impoverished from both northern Argentina and neighboring countries to the north.

The majority of Argentina's public social programs, aside from those related to health, are administered by the National Social Security Administration (ANSES). Argentines in the labor force earning less than 4,800 pesos (US$1,230) monthly, are entitled to benefits upon marriage, birth or adoption of a child, for maternity leave or prenatal care, and for a disability in a child, as well as to a modest unemployment insurance benefit for up to 6 months. The most important poverty relief program administered by the ANSES is the Universal Childhood Entitlement. The benefit, of 180 pesos (US$46) a month per child, is assigned to 3.7 million children under age 18 (30% of the nation's total), and includes the deposit of 20% of the check in a savings account accessible only upon certification of the child's enrollment in school.

The health needs of the poor in Argentina (and of a sizable proportion of the working class) is attended to by the public hospital system, which received funding of around US$8 billion in 2009, and whose quality of care typically falls short of the systems relied on by the nation's middle and upper classes (health cooperatives and private health insurance); health care for poor (and most non-poor) senior citizens is overseen by PAMI. The National Housing Fund (FONAVI) and its successors, the Provincial Housing Institutes, have also benefited the poor by facilitating access to affordable housing, and since 1976, has completed over a million housing units. The socio-economic crisis at the time prompted the enactment of the Program for Unemployed Heads of Households in early 2002, and at its height in 2003, around 2 million beneficiaries received debit cards worth 150 pesos (US$50) for part-time work; by 2010, the plan's impact on employment had become negligible.

Birth control among the poor, especially access to contraceptives, has long been discouraged by a succession of Argentine governments, as well as by figures in the influential Roman Catholic Church. Government policy instead rewards large families with subsidies that rise disproportionately with the seventh child, and though Argentine women have long had among Latin America's lowest birth rates (averaging 2.3 births per woman in recent years), the policy has tended to encourage higher birth rates in the lowest strata of society (including women least able to afford large families).

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in South America. According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which published an in depth report in December 2009, the latest poverty data available is from 2007. It shows that 60.1% of the population live in poverty and 37.7% in extreme poverty. 80.2% have access to electricity, 86% have access to running water, and only 50.8% have sewage system connections.

The socialist government of Evo Morales, which came to power in 2005, has introduced a number of measures to combat poverty.

The "Bono Juancito Pinto" gives school children grants of approximately US$29 (200 bolivianos) a year as an incentive to continue education to the 6th grade of primary school. It was introduced in 2006.

The "Renta Dignidad" was introduced in 2008 to prevent extreme poverty amongst the elderly. It gives all citizens over 60 a grant of US$258 (1800 bolivianos) or $344 (2400 bolivianos) to those not receiving social security payments.

The "Bono Juana Azurduy" provides new mothers with small financial incentives to seek pre and post natal medical care with the aim of reducing child mortality rates. It began in May 2009.

The above measures, along with increased provision of health and education services, are expected to result in reduced poverty rates for 2008 onwards.

Brazil is the largest country in South America, and is known to have a low to moderate poverty rate. Poverty in Brazil is more focused in the north-eastern region of the country: 60% of poor people live there, and the majority of them are of Afro-Brazilian heritage. Over 8.9 million Brazilians live on less than $2 a day. After the macroeconomic stabilization in the second half of the 1990s, different Brazilian administrations have increasingly addressed the issue of poverty. The "Fome Zero" (Zero Hunger) and "Brasil Sem Miséria" (Brazil without Poverty) programmes have lifted hundreds of thousands of people out of poverty. The former served as an umbrella programme for multiple conditional cash transfer initiative "Bolsa Familia". All three programmes were established under the Workers Party governments. The latter was instrumental in achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) of reducing extreme poverty in Brazil, with Brazil surpassing the target The poverty headcount in 2012 stood at 9%, down from 21% in 2005 and 34% in 1996. The rate of extreme poverty was 3.6% in 2012 compared to 13.4% in 1990. In 2014 Brazil managed to exit FAO's world map of malnutrition.

Despite Colombia having the 4th largest economy in Latin America, tourism booms, consistent GDP growth, Colombia continues to have mid-high levels of rural poverty. In recent years, the government has instituted new micro-economic regulations that have led to poverty reduction by increasing and supporting new opportunities to improve the lives of rural populations. Their poverty reduction strategy focuses on three components a) rural development, b) social and infrastructural services and c)decentralization. This country feels that if they put their main focus on these particular issues it has a good chance at dramatically reducing its rural- area poverty.

This country benefited from an oil boom during the 1970s, and despite this, 21% of the population still lives in poverty, and another 12% is vulnerable to it. One million out of its 13 million inhabitants can not meet the proper standards of living. This country has a high rural poverty. However its malnutrition rate is relatively low, and Health care is provided by the state so it prevents from causing high child mortality rates.

23.8% of the population is below the poverty line and 4% is very poor, per national surveys; the proportion of Paraguayans living in absolute poverty was 10.3%, as measured in the UN Human Development Index.
The problems associated with poverty that this country deals with is migration, language and that there is no standard welfare system. Water and sanitation conditions are also inefficient in rural areas, where the majority of the poor population is concentrated, which leads to the poor getting sick from the unsanitary way of living.

From 2000 to 2010, Peru's poverty rates dropped from 54.7% to 31.3%. The country's total poverty is 25.8%.

According to the World Bank, Peru has recently made great advances in development. It has been successful with "high growth rates, low inflation, macroeconomic stability, reduction of external debt and poverty and significant advances in social and development indicators". However, 1.4% of Peru's urban population lives below the poverty line, while the rural population sits at 19.7%. Reductions of inequality have occurred in Peru, but inequality is still high, with a GINI Index of 0.45.

This country suffers from low income jobs, poor teaching skills in the rural areas, as well as absence of full benefits for the primary health care and chronic problems that the country has. The poor people in rural areas are at greater risks for health illness because they lack access to clean water and sanitation.

The population has grown, and this is causing more poverty because the country's cities are becoming over crowded. Over the last few years Peru is showing a little improvement with the social welfare system and the consumption poverty rates. The social welfare system is reaching more out to the poor because the government is receiving more funding. The consumption poverty rates are slightly lower from 19% to 15%, but there are still millions of Peruvians suffering from severe poverty.

By 2013, 11.5% of the population remains under the poverty line.

Income poverty in Uruguay, historically low by regional standards, had increased substantially during that country's struggle with chronic stagflation from the 1960s until the mid-1980s; from 1986 to 1999, however, income poverty declined sharply, from 46% to 15%. Fallout from an earlier financial crisis in neighboring Argentina helped lead to a resurgence in poverty, to 27%, by 2006, though by 2008, a reduction of the rate to around 24% was measured, while 2.2% of the population remained in absolute poverty; as in many other nations, the poor in Uruguay suffer from far higher rates of unemployment than the population at large (27%, compared to an average of 7.5%). The rate of absolute poverty in Uruguay, measured as part of the UN Human Development Index, was 3.0% in 2009, and was the lowest in Latin America.

Despite the country being rich in natural resources, Venezuela has historically suffered from high poverty rates., recent income statistics show that the total poverty rate in the country stands at 31.9%. Of this group, 23.3% corresponds to relative poverty and 8.6% corresponds to absolute poverty.

It is worth mentioning that the above statistics measure only cash income and therefore does not include access to free health care and other basic services. The government of Venezuela has attempted to measure the rate of households unable to cover their basic necessities through income or government services. The figure for this group stands at 21.2% poverty, of which 14.5% is considered non-extreme and 6.7% considered extreme.